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ABSTRACT
The thesis is a study of the use of models in science and 
theology, particularly those concerned in the various concepts 
of creation. After a brief review of the philosophical background 
which looks at models of science, the discussion begins with 
the understanding and use of models in science. These are 
defined, their functions and applications are classified and 
the limitations are noted. It is then shown how the language 
of models is at the present time used much more widely and 
includes its use in theology. The relationship of this to 
metaphor, analogy and symbol is briefly discussed. The study 
continues with the understanding and use of models in theology 
and this compared with that in science. From this theoretical 
base, specific examples are considered and it is shown how 
model language can be used of the Biblical understanding of 
God the creator, and of the creation. The question ■ is asked 
of the ways in which models change or are changed, and this 
is considered in the context of T. S. Kuhn's book, "The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions"; and it is asked if change occur 15; 
by revolution or development. Four particular topics are 
then considered to illustrate the themes; cosmological models 
from early times to Kepler (the Copernican Revolution); models 
of the origins of the earth (the genesis/g ep^ogy debates); 
present day theories of cosmology; and some further biblical 
and theological aspects. In conclusion some general suggestions
are. proposed about the inter-relationships between models 
in science and theology.
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION
This present work is the result of many years interest and 
concern to relate my scientific and theological interests 
and the conviction that they could not be kept in separate 
compartments of my life. This thesis focusses on an integrated 
approach to one area, that of the use of models in both science 
and theology and in particular those concerned with creation. 
The term creation is used in both the sense of the act of 
creation and that which is created, the natural world , aryi 
the whole cosmos. It is clear, . for instance in the great 
popularity of television series such as Life on Earth and
Cosmos, that there is much popular interest in this subject. 
This is reflected also in the media's reporting on modern 
astronomy and space exploration and the related questions 
of how the universe and life is how it is. Those who are
Christians need to be able to make a theological response
to these issues and to offer a doctrine of creation that is 
appropriate for today. Often in the past, in Protestant theology, 
the doctrine of creation has tended to be neglected in favour 
of the doctrine of salvation but that is changing in response
to the scientific ethos of the present time. The interest 
in creation leads to questions about the creator and so it 
seems right to pursue the inter-relationship between science 
and theology as they concern this topic.
Scientists have used the term 'model' as part of their language
for at least the last hundred years and it has passed into
everyday usage. Now there does not seem any area of study 
that does not resort to it and that includes its use by theologians 
Behind the present day use of the term are concepts which 
are certainly very ancient, and in this thesis it is hoped 
to show how model language can be appropriately applied today, 
and to explore how it has been and is being used.
My aim is to look in some detail at how models are used in
both science and theology and to illustrate this by particular 
examples. The discussion begins in chapter two with the 
ways models in science are used and how they are understood.
I look at how they have been defined and classified and then 
look at their functions, applications and limitations in a 
more practical way. From this I move in the next chapter 
to show how model language can be extended to theology and 
I touch upon its relationship to metaphor, symbol and analogy.
In chapter four I relate the understanding and use of models 
in theology to the discussion in chapter two and discuss the 
similarities and the differences to the use in science. From 
this more theoretical discussion I show how it can be applied 
to the Bible and ways in which model language can be used
of God as creator and the creation. An important question
for those who use models is how they change or are changed, 
whether it is by development or by revolution. This is considered 
in chapter five in the context of T. S. Kuhn's thesis in his 
book "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions". In chapter 
six there is a consideration of some topics to illustrate
the theme and to develop some earlier themes, and I attempt 
to identify possible inter-relationships.
The final chapter draws together the various strands and I 
suggest some conclusions.
As the work proceded it became obvious how large a subject 
this is and how many areas of study it involves; it also became 
clear that it would be easy to get diverted into interesting 
byways. In a paper first published in 1963, 'Mapping the 
loê^^ of models in science and theology' , F. Ferre says "My
purpose .... is to show that the notion of the 'model' which
has received considerable attention and stimulated much controversy 
amongst scientists and philosphers of science, should be recognised 
as of central importance to theologians and philosophers of 
religion. In order to reach my goal I shall have to survey
and attempt to make intelligible a domaine for which there
exists few charts ---- " (1) He develops this idea of map
making in relation to models and I find this an helpful analogy;
for this present study has felt like a journey of exploration.
There are times when there seems no clear route on the map 
although others (e.g. S. McFague and I. G. Barbour) have marked 
out possible routes and I am grateful for their guidance.
It is hoped that this thesis will mark out one possible route 
and be a useful contribution to the development of more accuraate 
maps. Continuing the analogy of map making, it is necessary 
to state and briefly acknowledge those features of the landscape 
that are accepted as given so that the journey can proceed. Thus 
I see four areas which need to be noted and their assumptions
acknowledged. It is assumed
1. That it is possible to discuss the reality of the world
and of human experience. I realise that one key topic 
that is implicit in this discussion is that of reality.
What is real? For the person who is not a philosopher,
it can seem a meaningless question. Experience shows 
that people accept the reality of the physical world and
many would also make the same claim about religious experience.
Yet I recognise that for philosophers it is a vital matter 
and one that can be vigorously debated and even non- 
philosoiphers can find it problematic (e.g. optical illusions). 
As a generalisation it can be said that the perceptions 
of reality held by an individual are affected by the model 
of the universe that they hold, and this is affected by 
communal, cultural or religious influences.
2. That there are many 'languages' including scientific and
theological, but there is sufficient in common to enable 
sffsctive communication to take place. It is recognised 
that specialised languages . of discourse for particular
purposes are products of specialised communities. Each 
of these communities has its own symbolic language in 
terms of which it interprets its experience.'' (2) In 
the past there was a tendency to assume that all scientific 
language was providing a literal description of reality, 
now there is recognition that it also can have symbolic 
character and imaginative qualities. There are problems 
with religious language for, for some, it is seen as meaning—
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less and unsuited to the needs of the modern world. In
all disciplines there is the necessity for explanation 
and elucidation in order that there can be proper communication 
and dialogue.
3. That it is reasonable to hold the Christian faith and 
that theology is relevant to today's issues and questions. 
I, therefore, do not offer any arguments for the belief
in God as creator or justification for the views expressed 
on theological matters.
4. That it is worthwhile and legitimate to explore the inter—
^®l3-tionship between science and theology. There is an 
extensive literature in this area both academic and of 
a more popular nature which addresses many facets of this 
topic; this thesis highlights one area in this dialogue.
There are also commonly held assumptions, from which I would 
want to dissent, such as the notion that there is a complete
division, even antagonism between those who hold scientific 
views and those who hold theological views. The examples 
given to justify this are of the notable conflicts (e.g. between 
Huxley and Wilberforce or Galileo and the Church) but this 
ignores the considerable number of instances of dialogue and 
that many people are both scientists and Christians. Another 
popular view is that science alone deals with facts whereas 
theology does not. Yet many scientists would argue that alongside 
observation, interpretation and definition of the factual 
there is a place for the creative imagination in scientific
endeavour. It is now recognised that significant discoveries 
and breakthroughs have often come about apparently by chance 
rather than through normal scientific procedures. An example 
of how such a breakthrough occurs is recorded by J. Watson 
in "The Double Helix" the account of the elucidation of the 
structure of DNA. On the one hand there was the meticulous
and dedicated work of R. Franklin and M. Wilkins on the X-Ray 
structure of the molecule yet it was the creative approach
of F. Crick and J. Watson (with the aid of structural models)
that enabled the structure to be determined.
In recent years there has been reflection on the nature of
the scientific method and a recognition that it is probably 
never possible to be completely objective. J. Pol,kinghorne 
summarises it "Experiments are always theory-laden. The dialogue 
between observation and comprehension is more subtle and mutually 
interactive than is represented by the simple confrontation
of prediction and result." (3 )
Like-wise ' it needs to be stated that theology is not just
subjective. Since it is a reflection upon the religious experience 
of humankind, which is observable and universal, then there
can be claimed a rational basis for enquiry. J. Polkinghorne 
"..... there is an analogy between the activities of theology 
and science, in that both are concerned with understanding
and ordering experience .... there is an identifiable sphere
of human interaction with reality ... (which) ___ is a natural
source of material for the exercise of the theologians art." (4 ) 
Lastly, it is of interest to note that in the recent (1987) report
of the Doctrine Commission of the Church of England entitled 
"We Believe in God" there is acknowledgement of the place 
of the language of models in theology and of the connections 
with science. "What theologians offer are much more like
scientific 'models' than literal descriptions .... Scientists
work with 'models' of what they believe to be real, in order
to help their understanding and exploration ..... Models
are in this sense an indispensible tool of scientific thinking___
theological models .... are creative precisely because they
are not literal descriptions." (5)
Theye are very general observations which can only indicate 
something of the background to this study; further aspects 
will be considered as the work proceeds.
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE UNDERSTANDING AND USE OF 
MODELS IN SCIENCE
INTRODUCTION
In chapter one it was suggested that the use of the word 'model' 
is of comparatively recent origin but that the concepts which 
lié behind it could well be very ancient. The conscious 
use of the term in science has probably a longer history than 
in other disciplines. Here, it . has a universality in its applica­
tion which includes all areas and while it may be used by 
some scientists more than others it is never entirely excluded. 
This chapter is of the understanding and use of models in 
science. It is acknowledged and noted that there is an extensivS ; 
and wide ranging study concerning the models of science, 
which is the concern of historians of science and philosophers 
of science as well as practising scientists. This is a vast 
subject which continues to provoke much discussion with its 
own literature. It is recognised that the understanding of ^ 
models in science is influenced by the models of science. 
In the context of this study it is only possible to indicate 
something of the various schools of thought, since a full 
discussion is beyond the scope of the present work. (I would , 
also want to note that I recognise the importance of the question 
to the philosophers of science.) The factors that influence 
the present use of models in science are many and various. 
Some will be indicated here and others will be discussed later 
when specific examples are considered. The questions of particular 
interest are about the . relationships of models to reality, 
of models to theories and about the status of models.
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This has been summarised by I. G. Barbour in Myth, Models 
and Paradigms, where he outlines four theories of knowledge 
and their associated models of science and he indicates the 
corresponding understanding of models in science for each 
one.
1) Naive realism. This was the general scientific view until 
this century and "assumed that scientific theories were accurate 
descriptions of "the world as it is in itself". The entities 
postulated in theories were believed to exist, even if they 
were not directly observable". (1) This led.to a literal­
istic view of models. Lord Kelvin in 1884 said, "I never
satisfy myself until I can make a mechanical model of a thing. 
If I can make a mechanical model I can understand it." (2)
2) Positivism. The basis for this view is "that science 
starts from indubitable data which can be described in a neutral 
observation language independent of all theories. It was 
held that all theoretical terms must be translatable into 
pure observational terms by means of operational definitions".
(3) This leads to the dismissal of models as unnecessary
since theories can be inferred directly from observation.
3) Instrumentalism. There is some agreement with positivists 
but here it is argued that theories should be judged for their 
usefulness, it is acknowledged that there is a place for the 
imagination in the development of theories. Models are useful
mental devices, temporary aids to be discarded when they have 
served their purpose.
4) Critical Realism. Valid theories are seen as representative
of the real world and can be true as well as being useful.
Science involves the imagination as well as the understanding. 
Therefore, models are taken seriously but not literally.
There are thus various views of the relationship of models 
to reality and this involves religious models too, an area
to be discussed later. The generally accepted scientific
view of reality is that there exists a physical world that 
is coherent, consistent and independent of the individual. 
It is recognised in the practice of science (particularly
atomic physics) that the individual reacts, and is involved, 
with reality (that being observed or measured) but there continues 
to be a separation. Most scientists have a "sceptical
and qualified realism, according to which their models are 
regarded as candidates for reality, that is, models of hypotheses 
about a real (but only imperfectly known) world to which the 
models approximate and the hypotheses genuinely refer".
(4)
M. Hesse has argued that there is at present a move from logical 
to historical models of science, and this recognises the many 
changes that have occured, in particular the change from the
mechanistic, materialistic and deterministic models of science 
in the 17th and 18th centuries to the dynamic and relativistic 
models today.
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It is unlikely that a time will be reached when a final statement 
can be made, and as changes are noted in the past then they 
will surely take place in the future.
CLASSIFICATION AND DEFINITION OF MODELS
The literature offers various definitions of models in science, 
and from those reviewed it became clear that it is difficult 
to achieve a comprehensive clarity in this matter. Obviously 
there is overlap and often similar discussions yet there 
are differences in approach and application. It would seem 
that it is easier to observe how models are used than to define 
them in a concise and coherent manner; there are reasons 
for this including the fact that there are dynamic and imaginative 
qualities in their use which elude precise definition. Four 
different schemes will be considered from the many available, 
in order to provide the basis for the development of this 
discussion and also this will indicate some of the ways in
which people have attempted the task of classification.
1. A technical and comprehensive discussion of models is 
given in the Encyclopedia of Philosophy and this includes 
a survey of the use in formal logic as well as in the empirical 
sciences. The former while of some interest is less relevant
to this thesis than the latter but both will be looked at
since scientific models lie on a continuum between these 
two extremes.
"Formal logic is concerned with sets of axioms 
and their deductive consequences and also with the interpretation 
of these axioms and theorems in 'models' — that is sets of
entities that satisfy the axioms. These relationships are
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most easily exemplified in terms of geometry." (5) This
interpretation is in models and this formal and logical sense 
of model has been influenced and influences the empirical 
sciences without direct involvement apart from the carry
over from logic of the idea of the interpretation of a deductive 
system.
At the other ex-treme is the use which is nearest that of everyday 
language where model refers to a replica or scale model. 
These can be used "for expository purposes or even calculating 
devices in cases where the building of a replica or analogue 
of a system as a working model is the simplest method of 
investigating the consequences of those natural laws that
the system is believed to satisfy." (5) Many examples of 
these exist including wind-tunnel experiments, crystallographic 
models or hydraulic models of supply and demand. Before 
considering these two definitions a brief discussion of the 
relationship between model and modelled in terms of analogy 
is given. Two kinds of analogy can be distinguished, formal 
analogy and material analogy. In formal analogy there is 
a connection of isomorphism since the same axiomatic and 
deductive relations refer to the model and the modelled. 
In material analogy there is similarity between the parent 
system and its replica (as between a toy and a real car. ) 
This relationship can imply similarity or difference, that 
is positive or negative analogy. The classification of models 
in this scheme is mainly with respect to their function in 
relation to theories and has three divisions:
a) Semiformal or mathematical models. In these there is 
unlikely to be a physical model, rather the model is a means 
of enabling a theory to be expressed in a way that enables
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prediction or explanation. It is used in connection with 
the mathematical theorems of science and the analogy is of 
a formal kind.
b) Simplifying models. These are systems which simplify 
or idealise a system for convenience in research or application 
(for example, a scale model of a new design for an object). 
It also includes what are called archaic models which are
of no longer held theories but which have a use in applied 
sciences (for example the model of heat as a fluid).
c) Theoretical models. These are involved with the structures 
of theories and in some cases it would seem that they are 
identical with the relevant theory (for example the model 
of the D.N.A. molecule is in some senses identical to the
theory of the structure in terms of the spatial relationships 
but not in the nature of the bonding). However, this is 
not always the case, and models can lead to the development 
of a theory, and can be prior to it. Theoretical models
do depend on some other system, in particular, they use familiar 
and intelligible terms to offer explanation of a phenomenon 
or theory.
2. A different scheme has been proposed by R. Harrë^ in his 
book (The Principles of Scientific Thinking). His definitions 
are given in the context of his views on theories which he 
sees as being solutions to a peculiar style of problem. 
At the heart of a theory are various modelling relations
which are types of analogy. Initially he distinguishes between 
sentential and iconic models. The former would seem to resemble 
those of formal logic and are concerned with mathematical 
models. The latter is the type used in scientific discussion.
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He classes models into two broad groups homeomorphs and paramorphs 
which are based on his understanding of how models work. 
He distinguishes between the source (what a model is based 
upon) and the subject (what a model represents) of the model. 
Homeomorphs are those where source and subject are of the
same category. The relationship can be of three kinds, (i) 
Micro or megamorphs. The difference is one of scale and 
often there is some compromise in detail of structure. (ii) 
Teleiomorphs, which are idealisations or abstractions. (iii) 
Metriomorphs, which exist only as concepts as when the model 
represents a class (for example, the average family has 2.6 
children).
Paramorphs are those models where source and subject are 
different and are generally concerned with modelling processes. 
Harre considers this in two ways. Firstly in terms of the
relation to subject and proposes different levels of analogy;, 
secondly in relation to source and recognises different degrees 
of connectedness. He continues his discussion with an analysis 
of the many philosophical problems in the relationship of 
models to their subjects. This is noted but not reported
since this is not directly applicable to this present study.
3. F. Ferre (Philosophy and Religion ed. Gill) sets out 
a number of views of what constitutes a model. He lists 
models as mechanical contrivances; as scale models; as a 
mental picture; as an auxilliary concept in theory construction; 
as equivalent to analogue and finally as a focus of language
from one domain to another. He identifies three classes 
of questions about models focussing on type (their degree
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of concreteness); scope (their degree of inclusiveness); 
and status (their degree of importance). Among the types 
of model he notes scale models which permit relationships 
to be read in true proportion; structural models such as 
the molecular models of chemistry; mental models which defy 
construction but offer what he calls epistemological vividness; 
and conceptual models which includes mathematical models.
The scope of models can be very varied in application from 
those limited to a single entity to those which have general 
application.
4. I. G. Barbour in a similar classification gives four
main types; these serve a variety of purposes ranging from
the solving of practical questions to the constructing of 
theories. (i) Experimental such as scale models or working 
models which are used to solve practical problems. (ii) 
Logical models which are used by logicians and mathematicians 
and are entirely mental constructs. (iii) Mathematical models 
which are symbolic representations of physical systems which 
are often used for prediction, (ivj Theoretical models which 
"are imaginative mental constructs invented to account for
observed phenomena". (6) These connect by analogy the familiar 
with the unfamiliar and are the type most frequently used 
in science.
These four approaches give an indication of how different 
authors have attempted the task of classification and they 
provide a theoretical basis for the discussion of the uses 
of models in science.
There is also the whole question of the inter-relationship
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of analogy, model and symbol. At its simplest level analogy 
can be defined as "an observed or postulated similarity between 
two situations" (7) and a model as a " sy stematic analogy 
postulated between a phenomena whose laws are already known
V,
and one under investigation." ' (7) Symbols are conventions,
often arbitary, which may have their origins in models although 
they cannot become models. Symbols have an important role 
in the physical sciences and mathematics and as such are 
included in the formal and semi-formal types. This will 
be discussed further when the theological models are considered. 
THE APPLICATION AND FUNCTION OF MODELS 
APPLICATION
So far the discussion has been on the theoretical background 
of the use of models in science but alongside this it is 
recognised that the every day work of scientists involves 
the use of all types of models. This use is very much part 
of the practice of science as will be outlined here and developed 
in specific examples later.
Mathematical models are used in physics and chemistry to 
express through equations and formulae the results of practical 
experiment. These with the symbols for the elements enable 
the chemist to discuss in a written form complex chemical 
reactions in a way that is universally applicable. The physicist 
can similarly communicate the nature of physical processes 
of all kinds including mathematical formulae, scale models 
and working models. The chemist also uses various structural 
models to express the three dimensional nature of molecules, 
and these provide a useful means of exploring the relationship
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of structure and function. The simplifying models are often
used in biology to demonstrate the various functions of living 
things. At all levels and in all branches theoretical models
are proposed and are a means by which theories may be developed. 
Computing science is another discipline where the understanding 
and use of models is an integral part. This is seen for
example in a practical way when computers are used to provide 
graphical models which can be expressed visually and dynamically. 
This application is now widespread in most scientific disciplines 
providing explanation and new ways of communicating ideas 
both in the mass media, as for instance, in television scientific 
programmes as well as in research. It is a tool that is 
used in education and research for it has as an advantage 
the fact that the models can be shown dynamically and computer 
graphics can offer simulations of processes of many different
kinds and of very different scale, from cosmology to atomic 
physics! Computers have brought this application of models 
to a far wider audience than before and this could well have 
wider implications for their use. There is also the theoretical 
aspect which includes the complex question of the relation 
of computer theory to the human thought processes, a subject 
in its own right but which is not relevant to this study.
FUNCTIONS
In the discussion so far it has been shown that it is generally 
accepted models have an important function in the development 
of theories. Indeed some would argue that they have a necessary 
function. This will be further illustrated under the subsequent 
headings, although it is again not easy to make clear cut
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classification and there is necessarily overlap,. The limitations 
and problems will then be considered.
Communication Models are an important part of the communication 
among scientists and between scientists and non—scientists, 
since they provide an aid to the explanation and extension 
of concepts in all areas of science. By using the familiar
and the intelligible it is possible for concepts which are
difficult to be shared. This is particularly true about
the very small or the vast, for atomic physics or cosmology. 
M. Hesse puts a similar view, "Models like metaphors are 
intended to communicate. If some theorist develops a theory
in terms of a model, he does not regard it as a private language,
but presents it as an ingredient of his theory .. . None;
of this would be possible unless use of the model were inter- 
subjective, part of the commonly understood theoretical language 
of science". (8 ) Those who have the task of communicating 
the results of research would certainly find their task more 
difficult without them for complex phenomena can be simplified 
and made understandable by the use of appropriate models. This is 
particularly true where the mathematical theories of, say, 
astrophysics are conveyed by models. In this instance it
involves models of models, that is a physical or representational 
model to illustrate the mathematical model. That they have
this important function in communication has been borne out 
by the success of those television series on the status and 
origins of the earth and the universe.
The scientific endeavour is a communal activity, and models 
have, an important role in this. It has already been mentioned
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the place they have in chemistry. Chemists, through formulae, 
structural models and symbols can convey the content and 
results of experiments, reactions or molecular structures
in a way that would be impossible in words alone. The models 
provide a 'shorthand* which transcends language and cultural
barriers. This is also true in other scientific disciplines 
as any study of the literature would indicate.
Educational In education the use of models is an integral 
part of the study of all the scientific subjects. Teachers
and lecturers would find their task much more difficult without 
resort to models and the young are helped in the understanding 
of concepts. Even those who would generally reject models 
accept that there is a role in education. The 'how it works' 
models in museums are not only a source of interest to all 
ages but : provide useful means of enabling people to understand
scientific and technical concepts, be it how a car engine 
works or the motion of the planets in the solar system.i 
Mention has already been made of the use of models in the 
media and in computers. This function is not merely for 
information but also to encourage the making of new discoveries 
for the individual.
Interpretation and development Models can provide the basis 
for experiment and the development of new theories which 
can prove to be a complex process. At a basic level the 
study of a reaction or phenomenon will lead to the proposal 
of an hypothesis or possibly a theory; this will be explained 
by a model which is then able to indicate further areas of 
topics for investigation. However, in the practice of science
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it is rarely as straightforward as this, for there is a more 
involved interplay at all stages. Certainly a good model 
can suggest a number of possible areas for future investigation. 
This developmental aspect of models is an important one and 
many would say a necessary part of the process. There can 
be times when a model has to be completely discarded, or 
changed so much that there seems little connection with the 
original. This raises the question of how models change 
and this will be considered later. Interpretation of newly 
discovered systems is helped by the use of models of a similar 
or parallel system, since they give intelligibility to that 
which might seem unintelligible, as for example in the development 
of models of the atom. Bohr proposed a model of the atom 
which was modelled on the ways the planets orbit the sun, 
a model now superceded but which still has limited educational 
value. Interpretation in terms of the familiar is important 
in the proposing of novel theories.
Prediction Models are used to make predictions of the possible 
outcome of theories and in particular have wide practical 
applications. For example, engineers will test models of 
new structure in wind tunnels to predict their aerodynamic 
qualities. Scale models also enable predictions to be made 
about potential hazards where it would be impossible or impractical 
to work in the actual situation. Predictive models are used 
in the behavioural and social sciences. Theoretical models 
can also be predictive and suggest areas for future investigation 
that is, if the model is valid certain deductions can be 
made and experiments carried out to test the deduction.
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The prediction and subsequent confirmation of the microwave 
background radiation as a result of the 'Big Bang' is an 
excellent example of this and will be referred to later.
Creativity and imagination Models can be the source of
new and innovative theories, and can be considered in that 
sense creative. It is recognised that there is a place for 
the use of the imagination in scientific discovery; for innovative 
ideas and new directions come from lateral thinking. In 
the past those with mechanistic and materialistic views or 
those of positivist views tended to deny a place for imaginative 
or creative thought. It is now recognised that those who
have the ability to connect ideas, to use models, in an 
imaginative way are those who will be the leaders in scientific 
developments. S. McFague quotes Max Planck "that the pioneer 
scientist must have a 'vivid imagination for the new ideas
are not generated by deduction, but by artistically creative 
imagination"i (9) She is also emphatic that "imagination - 
understood as analogical association of novel and significant 
similarity in spite of difference — is essential to scientific
thinking" (10) It seems clear that the use of models is
very much part of this. This can subsequently involve discarding 
one model and replacing it with another, as was the case 
with the understanding of the structure of the atom. Proposed 
models can provide the basis for fruitful discussion (or 
great disagreement) and knowledge is extended. The continuing 
debate between those who propose and oppose the model of 
the 'Big Bang' origin of the universe has been productive 
of new concepts and better understanding. There is also
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a dynamic character in some models which leads to new and 
creative ideas.
Practical Models can enable experiments to be done which 
it would not be possible to do in an actual situation for 
reasons of safety, cost or scale. There are also a number 
of situations where it is not possible to carry out an experiment, 
cosmology being a prime example. From observation and theoretical 
calculation theories are proposed as to origins and further 
work is only possible with models. There is no possible 
way in which the original conditions for the formation of 
the earth can be reproduced! The Miller—Urey experiment 
provided a model for a possible scenario for the beginnings 
of life on earth but it is limited to being just that , a 
possibility, proof is never possible.
Conclusion So far the discussion has been on the positive 
aspects of the general function and application of models, 
it has also reflected something of the philosophical background. 
However, even those who support and value the use of models 
have to recognise the limitations and disadvantages. These 
will now be discussed.
LIMITATIONS OF MODELS
So the discussion has shown the positive aspects of models
in science, but equally it has to be recognised that there
are real limitations in their use. The main limitation is
that a model does not reproduce reality, (it reflects it
maybe), although that is often the expectation of people.
The mistake that is made is to presume that a model will
give total explanation or total identity. This may seem
an extreme statement, but it is often the result when scientists
seek to explain themselves to the general public. Ask the
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ordinary person who has done some science at school how they
would describe the atom. It will probably be said that it 
is the smallest known particle, or in terms of the planetary 
model, and in both cases the model will be seen as identical 
to the atom. Part of the problem is that the whole concept 
and use of models is rarely explained at any level in the 
education system. It is part ofthe language of the scientist,
but it is not consciously part of the language of the pupil 
or at least not in the theoretical sense. The de.sire for
total explanation can also lead to the problem of total identifica­
tion of model with that modelled. For where there are tendencies 
to this absolutist view then the model becomes so identified 
with the modelled in a theory that it is difficult for it 
to be replaced. This is particularly true when a model becomes 
part of the everyday language of people but the 'rules'
by which it is accepted or rejected do not. This lack of 
definition and explanation can lead to another limitation
in the use of models. It can lead to erroneus ideas of what
is being modelled. R. Schegel states "The natural world 
disclosed by quantum theory has a flexibility that was altogether 
lacking in the machine.like universe of classical physics. 
Particles like tiny billiard-balls, self determined in their 
physical properties and behaving in strictly causal patterns^ 
have simply failed as hypothetical constructs; they do not
allow the development of models that have natures richness
of process and structure." (11) , Similarly while it is
useful to discuss the function of the brain in terms of computer 
models, if this is seen as a total description it can lead
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to a mechanistic view which ignores(or is ignorant of) the 
questions of mind/body and mind/brain relationships. The 
thinking, feeling^ living person is much more than the computer 
model. There is here, too, the problem of inversion. That 
the computer models some aspects of the brain is true, but 
it is not to be inferred that the way the brain works is 
like the computer. This limitation has particular importance 
when the models in theology are considered.
Many models are limited in that they can only show one aspect 
of that which is being modelled. There is what I would call 
the 'but also' factor. The planetary model of the atom is 
useful at some stages of learning, but also it needs the 
amplification and modifications of quantum mechanical models 
to give a fuller and more accurate picture. Alternatively 
this is referred to as the is/is not factor. Atoms (and
molecules) can usefully be considered as solid particles 
- the gas laws for 'ideal' gases are derived from such a 
model. Yet alongside this has to be set the statement that 
an atom is not solid, the quantum description has to come 
to the fore.
The models which are abstractions cannot have all the qualities 
of the subject, and yet they can still show the potential
of a theory. For example, this means it is possible to make 
the statement that 'atoms exist' while continually(and drastically)
modifying the understanding about their nature. This limitation
of is/is not is particularly relevant to physics, for there 
can often be no single inclusive model, for say light or
electrons. Rather there is the recognition of the need for
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what is described in the wave/particle principle of 
complementarity. Literalistic models can be a definite disad­
vantage here, unless they are rightly understood.
Another limitation is that models can lead to reductionist 
views. The argument being that models can simplify complex 
and difficult theories, and everything can eventually be 
reduced to simplicity. This has its value but it fails to
account for the complexity and diversity that exists. It 
needs to be recognised that a model is only able to show
some features or feature. A model of the solar system if 
it is to show some aspects of the planets and say their orbits 
may not be able in the same model indicate the scale of distances 
neither can it give any indication of origins.
It is possible that models can restrict the acquisition of
new knowledge. The model becomes so identified with its
source that the thinking becomes 'straight-jacketed' and
theories are modified to meet the needs of the model rather
than the reverse. The history of science can provide many
examples of this, for example, the early chemists commitment
to the phlogiston theory or astronomers to Ptolemaic cosmology.
There is alongside this the cultural aspect of models. There
are times when to speak of atoms in terms of billiard-balls
is helpful but it has to be stated categorically that they
are not like that and furthermore those who know nothing
of billiards will not see the point of the model anyway.
M. Hesse draws attention to another question which is relevant
to this, the underdetermination of theory by empirical data
and she discusses this in relation to the models of cosmology. •
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"There are many alternative model universes in scientific 
cosmology, all more or less fitting the facts as we know 
them from our very limited observations in space and time,
and between which further observational tests are sometimes
possible but never anything like decisive." (12) If
this is the case .that more than one model can fit the 
observations then there arises the difficulty of how choice 
is made between models and the appropriateness of the model 
that is favoured. In these circumstances it is understandable
that some people would prefer not to have any model at
all. Another disadvantage is when models are used and
I
the user is unaware that they are models. S. McFague urges 
caution concerning these 'subliminal' models, which she 
sees as very widespread. "Most of us live most of the 
time within the power of models of which we are unaware.
The models are a part of 'paradigm', an entire set of 
assumptions .... (which are) largely unquestioned..."
(13) This is probably more true in the social sciences,
but it can also be true in science where the model is used 
without it being recognised that it is a model.
Some have argued that the disadvantages of models are such 
that it would be better not to use them at all, a position 
I would not hold, rather I would want to stress the value 
of models for the reasons given. Models have their limitations, 
they can never convey the complete picture of what is being 
modelled but they are a necessary part of the theory and 
practice of science. It is good to be reminded of R. Braithwaite's 
statement that "the price of the employment of models is eternal 
vigilance." (14)
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These arguments will be developed further when the models 
in theology are discussed and the relationship to those in 
science explored.
WHAT MAKES A GOOD MODEL?
If models are accepted as a useful and necessary part of 
science, then there has to be an assessment of what is required 
of a good model. In the discussicn of the disadvantages it
became clear that part of this is less to do with the models 
themselves than with how they are used or with their effectivenes 
in communication. The problem then tends to become one of
subjective judgement. Good models are those which function 
effectively, i.e communicate, have heuristic value, enable 
interpretation and development, have predictive potential, 
are practical and extend knowledge in an imaginative and
creative way. S. McFague states "A good model is concrete
and detailed and must be sufficiently different from its 
pr*inciple subject to spark insight." (15) The 'goodness' 
of a model is judged by the extent to which it meets these 
criteria and by its acceptance by the scientific community. 
This raises questions about both the scientific community 
and how models change, and these will be considered when 
T. S. Kuhn's work is discussed. Many models are developed 
from experimental and observational data and for it to be 
a good model requires that the model 'fits' the data and 
conveys the essence of the experiment or observation. A 
*^ if'f'iculty arises where, as has been mentioned, there is 
underdetermination of the facts. There are times when the
model is the best there can be at the time. There has to
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be a willingness to accept that the good model may have to 
be replaced by a better. Finally it has been noted that
there is positive and negative analogy in the use of models. 
It is also recognised that for most types of model in science 
and in theology that there is often neutral analogy. The 
degree of neutral analogy can be an aid in assessing how
good a model is. This discussion is particularly relevant
to the discussion of models in theology and will be dealt 
with in chapter four.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE EXTENSION OF MODEL LANGUAGE TO THEOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
The background to this study is the conviction that for Christians 
it is meaningful to speak of God, the God who is known through 
revelation and experience. There continues to be a real problem 
for those who hold this faith, of how to speak to those who 
do not share it, since for those who are outside the tradition, 
there is the apparent barrier of theological language. Analogy, 
metaphor, and symbol have all had a role in the conveying 
of Christian religious experience and revelation. Today,
I am sure that there is a contribution to be made by the explanation 
and eluciation of models in theology.
In chapter two the understanding and use of models in science 
was discussed and an indication was given of the philosophical 
debate that continues. In recent years the use of the language 
of models has become widespread and is to be found in most 
disciplines including social sciences and now is to be found 
in theology. As far as I can ascertain it was first used 
in this connection by I. T. Ramsey in his book 'Religious 
Language' published in 1957. Since then it has been widely 
used in 'many different contexts. As in science there is a 
diversity in the way the term is used and therefore classification 
can be equally problematic.
There is also much overlap with other terms such as metaphor 
and symbol, and different writers put their nuances on to
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these or, in some cases,use them as synonymous. J. Macquarrie 
writers "When one is confronted with a notion so difficult
to grasp as that of Spirit, we must turn to analogies, images, 
pictures, models whatever we may care to call them in the
hope of getting some illumination. Images and analogies, 
do not describe in a literal or direct way, but they point
us indirectly to the reality." (1) Later in the same chapter
he says "there are many images of the Spirit ___ Perhaps
the first thing to be said in elucidation of the basic image
of the Spirit as the wind is to point out that it is a dynamic 
mod el. " ( 1 ) A nalogy and metaphor are very common and have
ancient and long usage in theology; model is recent and is 
probably derived from the use in science. But whether that 
derivation can be seen as a deliberate or conscious act or 
if it is rather an unacknowledged acceptance of current terminlogy 
is not always clear. For Ramsey (who was also a scientist)
it was a conscious act, but for many non-scientists the term
has become accepted more by a process of 'osmosis' and this
has led to its use being less precise. Thus model is today
often used by theologians and increasingly it is found to 
be appropriate and applicable in many and widely different
areas of study. It is proving to be as useful a concept here
as its use in science and although it may have a lesser role 
I would want to suggest that the ideas and language in one 
domaine can illuminate and extend those in another. The language 
of models can be a useful and creative method of communication
within science and also within theology and between them.
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Before discussing further the function and use of models in 
theology brief comments will be made about the use of metaphor, 
analogy and symbol, (a)
METAPHOR
Metaphors are very common and are a part of everyday 
language. Through an intelligible but odd conjunction 
between one context and a new or different one, new aspects 
and new ideas are opened up. Metaphors are not literally 
true, but through significant and selective analogy enable 
the ordering of perceptions and the sharing of experience. 
Poetry uses metaphor in a particularly creative way. 
Metaphors are dynamic, often possess emotional and valuational 
properties and can influence perception and interpretation 
of experience or observation.
S. McFague says "The most outstanding feature of the 
human mind is its mobility, its constant, instantaneous 
power of association, its ability to be forever connecting 
this with that." (2) This ability to make connections, 
to seek similarities and dis-similarities can be seen 
in the use of metaphors. It is difficult to offer precise 
definitions of metaphor because it is a way of thinking 
"Metaphor belongs to the semantics not the syntax of
language." (3) The truith of a metaphor cannot be
assessed in a literalistic manner, and' this needs to
be recognised since problems can arise when that does 
happen. "It is because some metaphors have structural
(s) There is a considerable literature which discusses,
defines and applies the terms metaphor, analogy and symbol.
The brief discussion here is mainly to acknowledge its existence 
and to recognise the necessity to note it.
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possibilities that . . . models can develop from them, for
models are dominant metaphors with comprehensive, organizational 
potential." (4)
ANALOGY •
There are a number of forms of analogy, and as with models 
there are differences in emphasis. The common definition 
is that analogy is the observed or postulated similarity 
between two situations. It is the extension of patterns
of relationship drawn from one area to co-ordinate with
others. Analogy is used very widely and it is frequently 
found in religious language.
In medieval times a solution to the problem of religious 
language was proposed with the development of the logic
of analogy. This is a complex subject and not easy for
modern minds to grasp since it requires a knowledge of 
the philosophical ideas of that period. However a useful 
summary is given by J. Hick, "Aquinas's basic and central 
idea is not difficult to grasp. He teaches that when 
a word such as "good" is applied both to created being 
and to God it is not being used univocally (i.e. with
exactly the same meaning) in the two cases .... Nor, on 
the other hand, do we apply the epithet "good" to God 
and man equivocally (i.e. with completely different and
unrelated meaning) . There is a definite connection
between God's goodness and man's reflecting the fact that
God created man. According to Aquinas, then "good" is 
applied to creator and creature neither univocally or
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equivocally but analogically." (5) This analogy is
known as the analogy of being and it is presented in two 
different ways. There is the analogy of attribution 
(proportion). This is a direct linking of two terms (analogates) 
which may differ widely from each other but which one 
- the prime analogate - possesses a characteristic formally 
or intrinsically while the other has predicated a like 
characteristic in a derivative sense. An example quoted 
is that men and mountain resorts can both be called 'healthy'. 
Analogy of proportionality. This is stated as a similarity 
between two proportions.
" Hinting at the roots of this analogy in Greek mathematics, 
the analogy of proportionality is sometimes symbolised:
God's qualities creature's qualities
God's nature creature's nature
Either the two are to be linked (as in mathematics) by 
an equality sign, or they are not. If the first alternative 
is chosen the relation between proportions is identity, 
and God's goodness is to God exactly as man's goodness 
is to man. Identity in the relation leads to univocation 
and a threat to God's uniqueness. If, on the other hand, 
the equality sign is replaced by some other link between 
proportions then the analogy loses its precision and 
usefullness." (6)
Another problem is that 'being' is not used today in the 
sense used in the medieval logic of analogy and therefore 
it is difficult for it to add anything to our present under­
standing. This form of analogy at its best provided a
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"framework for certain limited statements about God, without 
infringing upon the agnosticism, and sense of mystery of the 
divine being, which have characterised Christian and Jewish 
thought at its best." (7)
Analogy involves the creative, the imaginative and the poetic, 
the problem arises once analysis is attempted or if a literal 
interpreptation is put upon the words. The same problem that 
has been observed with the use of models.
In the discussion of models in science it was noted that the 
relationship between model and modelled can be in terms of 
analogy. The analogy can be of three types, positive, negative 
or neutral and these types are equally applicable to models 
in theology. Positive analogy is the obvious type and is noted 
in the making of relationships and the offering of explanation 
from the familiar to the unfamiliar. At its simplest it is 
seeing obvious likenesses. Negative analogy is the recognition 
of what models are not claiming to explain or identify. It 
is the dissimilar, the unlike. The criteria for deciding where 
negative analogy is observed seems partly from commonsense 
and experience and partly from experience in other are^ ,,. Negative 
analogy is important in theology, e.g. where it is seen in 
the Old Testament prohibitions against idolatory. There has 
to be a recognition of what God is not, for example, the under­
standing that humans are made in the image of God does not 
mean that God is made in their image. Theological insight 
sees the Creator as other than the Creation. In all models 
there is the requirement of not taking the model literally
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- the recognition of negative analogy should prevent this.
It is in neutral analogy that there can be productive and creative
use. S. McFague says "A good model; in science, and, we would 
add, in theology, is one with a large fund of neutral analogy, 
unexplored potential for connections. It is the neutral analogy 
that provides further possibilities for discovering new relations 
between model and modelled." (8)
SYMBOL
Symbols are a part of religious language and experience not
only in Christianity but in all religions. The relationship
between symbol and model requires consideration for in some
ways there are aspects common to both, in everyday language
as well in the more specialised usage in science and theology.
Basically a symbol has a capacity to stand for something other
than itself. Symbols are "born out' of life" and "appear to
be built into man's experience." (9) This aspect has been
given much attention by Jung, who saw symbols as part of the
collective unconscious, and therefore they cannot be created
by human imagination. Symbols of light and darkness are there
as part of human experience of the world. Although the same
symbols are found in various religions, cultures and times
and they do have a universality which derives from common experienc
and a common manner of responding to that experience there
are real differences in the meaning given in different cultures.
(Water is used as a symbol in many religions but obviously
the symbolism will have a different context in the Sahara to
that in Scotland!) Even so, symbolic language can communicate
the symbol to others and enable religious experience to be
expressed and shared. The Bible is full of symbols which speak
of the relationship of God and humankind, and this is an essential
aspect of symbols in theology. T. Fawcett argues therefore
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"that: this intuitive, experiential aspect of symbols means tthat 
they cannot be created or destroyed by intellectual argument. 
Symbol is used widely in science and mathematics to denote 
algebraic terms, physical constants or chemical elements etc. 
Although it perhaps would be more appropriate to describe these 
as signs; they are not symbols in the religious or psychological 
sense, but do have a universal significance and application. 
In some cases it would seem that symbol and model are synonymous 
but in general it can be said "Symbols do not denote things
which are already understood but attempt to push forward the 
frontiers of knowledge and to mediate the reality of things." (10) 
There is a subjective, experiential aspect in symbol not observed 
in models. Models can come to have a symbolic value and symbols 
may be given new and deeper meanings from scientific models. 
Light is one of the symbols that is universal and ancient but
some have found new understanding of its significance from
the present scientific models of light and their pair'd)xical
nature. A model can also come to have symbolic value when 
it evokes a personal response. It would seem that it is here
that there is much overlap between scientific and theological
models. Strictly speaking a scientific model is seen as objective 
and indifferent to human response, the personal is excluded 
if at all possible. Yet the images evoked by the scientific 
models can have an effect on the imagination, as has already
been indicated that this aspect can be taken into religious 
understanding.
Metaphor and symbol will continue to have an important role 
in our communication of ideas, thoughts and experience. The
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extension of model language to theology is proving to be an 
additional and valuable tool in communication today. • The influence 
of science is ubiquitous and increasingly it is seen to affect 
the ways of thinking and speaking in all disciplines. This 
is reflected in the moves from the ontological to the dynamic, 
from being to becoming, which require new modes of speech: 
this is offered in the language of models. How the term can
be applied in theology and to the Bible will be illustrated 
by the examples in the next chapter.
SOME EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF MODEL BY THEOLOGIANS 
I. T. RAMSEY
His particular concern was with the use of model to illustrate 
a theory about religious language and his view is limited to 
that and he offers no discussion of this in context to the
relation to its use in science (a). In his book 'Religious
Language' he seeks to establish a logical structure for the 
traditional language of philosophical theology. In particular
he develops the idea of the qualified model. "The function 
of the model is to found the theological story on empirical 
fact; the qualifier (a) develops such stories until a typical
religious situation is evoked and then (b) claims an appropriately 
odd logical placing for the word "God". (1) Ramsey begins
his discussion
(a) For example there is an acceptance by Ramsey of God's immutabi­
lity and impassibility which other theologians would not hold. 
His emphasis on the 'oddness' of some religious language reflects 
the background of his time and the concern with linguistic 
analysis. However, while acknowledging these reservations
about his views it is important to recognise that he probably 
instigated the use of the term model in theology and others 
have developed this for themselves.
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with a consideration of what kind of situations are religious 
and what for these situations is the appropriate language.
The nature of religious language is dependent on the understanding 
of the claims of religion to discernment and subsequent commitment^ 
He considers how it is possible to talk about God, and the 
attributes of God. Ramsey proposes ways in which an answer 
can be given. Firstly, there is 'negative theology' whereby
the emphasis begins with perceptual situations and then contrasts 
them by denial in order to speak of God. Secondly, by using
the method of contrasts, where say simplicity is studied, and
then its opposite - complexity — and by analysis an understanding 
is reached. It is the third way that he proposes that is
of interest in this study, and this is by the use of models
and qualifiers, and how they invoke a characteristically religious
situation. Ramsey defines model thus "It is a situation with 
which we are all familiar and which can be used for reaching
another situation with which we are not so familiar." (12) 
The model is modified by a qualifier which "is a directive 
which prescribes a special way of developing those model 
situations." (12) He then gives a number of examples
of qualified models which illustrate his argument. For example
the phrase 'first cause' where the model 'cause' is qualified
by 'first'. It is possible to discuss the meaning, use and
context of cause, it is generally understood what the word 
means, and its relationship to other situations. The qualifier 
'first' leads the thinking about cause further and further 
backwards until a situation of discernment is evoked and the
statement first cause leads to a religious statement about
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God as First Cause. Similarly with the phrase 'creation ex 
ni hilo' Creation as a model is understood in a straightforward 
sense,and is part of the language of the poet, artist, musician
as well as the theologican. Qualified by ex nihilo there is 
a movement from the ordinary to an understanding of a relation 
with the whole universe — and there is cosmic discernment. 
Yet creation is always out of something in ordinary language; 
ex nihilo qualifies the model in a way in order to evoke a 
religious situation, and is not like the phrases which indicate 
that from which sq^thing is created. Religiously it makes 
a present claim about God rather than a statement about the 
past. These two examples given an idea of how Ramsey dealt
with the problem of language as he saw it, and how he introduced
the use of model into theological thought. However, when his
discussion is considered in the context of the last chapter
it seems that his use of model is a limited one. I recognise 
it is a tentative beginning but for me it does not really illumin— 
,iate the problem of religious language mainly because his models 
are hot like the scientific models and the use of 'qualifiers'
is not now an issue.
F. FERRE
I have already referred to Ferre's article (chapter one, reference 
1) and his use of model language in the context of what he 
calls 'map—making' and of how he sees the importance and practical 
application of the term for theologians. Thus he uses the 
idea of making maps as the basis for his discussion and in
a clear and concise manner discusses the place of models in
science. , He develops his argument and suggests that as there
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are models in science so there should be models in theology. 
His main conclusion is that models in both fields are useful 
as "instruments for understanding." (14) In conclusion he 
notes the common features and the divergent features of the 
use of models in science and theology. Some of these will 
be referred to later. Here is the stated aim of making and
relating the two uses in a positive way, a way which begins 
the development of the philosophical understanding in theology 
of the place of models.
S. McFAGUE
In her book 'Metaphorical Theology' she offers the fullest 
discussion of models in theology of all the works which I have
consulted. She notes that this is comparatively novel, although, 
the seeds of the idea are present in many places. She says
"In the continuum of religious language from primary, imagistic 
to secondary, conceptual, a form emerges which is a mixed type;
the model. The simplest way to define a model is as a dominant
metaphor, a metaphor with staying power .... . Models are
necessary, then for they give us something to think about when
we do not know what to think, a way of talking when we do not 
know how to talk." (15) She sets out her understanding
of models in science and of models in theology, where they
agree and where they differ in order to develop her contribution 
to theological thinking and its relevance for today.
From these three authors, whose writing covers some twenty
years, it can be seen how the model language has been extended
to theology. McFague shows the most developed and thorough
survey of models in theology and science as they pertain to
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her particular theme and her views have been useful to me in 
this thesis.
Others have also used the term model in their writings including 
I. G. Barbour, J. McQuarrie and A. Peacocke and N. Pittenger 
and these are quoted in other chapters.
There is no doubt that models have become a part of the theological 
vocabulary but as yet few have developed the philosophicals aspects 
in the extensive and varied way that exists with scientific 
models.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE UNDERSTANDING AND USE OF MODELS IN THEOLOGY 
INTRODUCTION
In chapter two I considered the understanding and use of 
models in science, in this chapter I am considering models 
in theology along the same lines. I have already shown how
the language of models has nowadays become part of theological
language reflecting the extensive use that is made in all 
areas of life. Difficulties arise when an attempt is made 
at concise classification but this is probably no more difficult 
here than it was for models in science. As the use becomes 
even more widespread then subtle changes are noted, with
different people placing different nuances on the word and 
maybe only in the longterm will a fuller analysis become 
possible. However, there is sufficient consensus for the 
present discussion and to make comparisons between science 
and theology. It is clear that 'model' is a valuable tool 
for communication, with considerable scope for creative thought. 
To conclude this chapter examples to illustrate the uses
will be given from the Biblical models of Creator/creation.
The majority of philosophers of science agree that models 
have a necessary place in the practice and theory of science; 
although a few would argue that they can ultimately be discarded. 
The fact that they are being increasingly used in theology 
would indicate a similar status for them — they are necessary 
— but it is also argued that they are essential. For instance 
Ferre is emphatic "For not only' are the models of theology 
essential for the interpretation of theological discourse
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within the language using community but - at least equally
important - these models are necessary for the expression
of religious beliefs to the world at large." (1)
This discussion is concerned with models in theology and 
to compare and contrast their understanding and use with models 
in science. The questions of models of science was briefly
mentioned, however, it is not as simple to do the same for
models of theology. To even begin to discuss models of theology 
with all the historical, doctrinal and philosophical implications 
is beyond the scope of this study. There is one significant 
difference, for instance, between science and theology which 
should be noted. Science is an academic discipline and at
one level theology is also studied academically, but it is 
far wider than that for it is rightly claimed that theology 
can be a proper concern of all Christian people since it relates 
to all of life. The models of theology are far more numerous, 
diverse and have greater consequences for attitudes and actions 
than those of science. To indicate this diversity one needs only 
to look briefly at some of the models of God. There is general 
agreement that one of the divisions in the models of God 
is between the 'monarchial' ones which stress the transcendence 
of God and the 'organic' which stress the immanence of God. 
The monarchical models have traditionally been dominant, 
where God is seen as sovereign ruler of all that is and is
completely distinct from the created world. This model sees
the relation of God to the world as -asymetrical and the 
omnipotence of God is emphasised. The problem with this 
is that it can become a model where God is seen as "cosmic
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manipulator, imperial Caesar, ruthless moralist, defender 
of the status quo and dominant male" (2) and the model 
has justified despotic rulers, tyranical government and the 
despoliation of the environment. An alternative to that 
one is the organic model which sees a more symmetrical relation­
ship between God and humankind. God is involved in the world 
and affects and is affected by it. This is more dynamic 
and stresses interdependence. Other models of God are identified 
by other writers and Barbour, for example, lists five, monarchical 
deist, dialogic,agent and process models. There are limitations 
to all of these and the organic ones can be seen as tending 
to pantheism.
There can be seen some similarity here with those of science, 
since the model affects and reflects the approach and attitudes 
in science. The key difference is the claim for all theological 
models that they are comprehensive and involving in a way 
not known for science, for there is behind all the models 
a 'model of models'. McFague makes this point strongly "The 
broadest type of theological model - the metaphysical model of 
the relations between God, human being, and the world — is
without limit ...... (it) is understood as a cosmic, metaphysical
drama of relationships, of action and response, which includes 
everything that exists." (3)
APPLICATION AND FUNCTION OF THE MODELS 
APPLICATION
The examples already given show how widespread is the application 
of models in theology. In fact the use is so general in 
all areas be it doctrine, liturgy, ethics, 'popular' religious 
writing or in the spoken word, that the term is found present
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in much everyday language. However, when compared to the 
applications in science there are differences. One obvious 
difference is that there are no equivalents to the mathematical, 
structural or scale models to be found in science. The prohibi­
tions against the making of idols would prevent the attempt to 
make a scale model of God! Furthermore, there is the matter 
oi* ihe possibility or rather the impossibility of suggesting 
what could be on a scale with infinity — the infinity of 
God. So it is with the theoretical models that the discussion 
is concerned and in the various examples that have been and 
will be given the applications will become clearer.
FUNCTION
It is possible to make some general classifications of models 
in theology in the same manner that I classified those in 
science, whilst recognising that this cannot be clear cut 
in either field. These will be outlined here and further 
developed when the similarities and differences are considered. 
Conununication It has already been noted that there is an 
extensive use of models and they have become very - much part 
of the common language both wilhin and between subjects. 
Therefore it becomes necessary to use them as a means of 
communicating theological truths and religious experience.
In the past, allegory, images, metaphors, analogies and stories 
have been variously used to enable the relevance and significance 
of difficult concepts or religious experiences to be shared 
and this is seen in the writers of the Old Testament, the 
New Testament and through subsequent Christian history. 
Some material has been described at different times, in different 
ways, for example the parables of Jesus are called stories, 
metaphors and now are seen as models (by Ferr^). It is of
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the essence of Christianity that it is a faith to be shared,
so to use model language to do this is appropriate today. 
Like science, theology is a communal activity and an expression 
oi corporate as well as individual experience. Communication 
by models can assist the ordering of experience and its inter- ' 
pretation and the integration into the totality of human 
experience. "They not only direct attention to particular 
aspects of and patterns in experience but provide a frame
work within which a variety of types of experience can be
integrated." (4) This function will be further explored
as the work proceeds.
Educational There are^ no equivalents of, say, the working 
models used in science but the models under discussion will
obviously have an important role in education and teaching.
As in science the same caution has to be exercised but models 
enable concepts to be grasped in a positive and useful way. 
Interpretation and development The role of models in inter­
pretation is as necessary a part of the process of communication 
in theology as in science, but it is a very different role
because of what is being communicated. In theology the emphasis 
is on the revelatory and experiential. There is no place 
for the experimental as in the physical sciences. However, 
it could be said that there is a limited form of experiment
exist ing when it is observed how any model works out in life
and belief; some models may be discarded for the results
they produce. Ferre has argued that models in theology are 
essential for making intelligible interpretations of experience. 
McFague makes a similar claim that "the central role of models 
in theology is to provide grids or screens for interpreting
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this relationship between the divine and human". (5) The 
variety and nature of religious experience is considerable 
and it is extensively recorded and reported. Part of the
function of models is to interpret the many types of experience 
and to relate them to other experiences and to put them into 
wider context. Then if the models function effectively they 
enable the development of new understanding of concepts and 
lead to new commitments for the individual and the community. 
Prediction Models in science have an important role in the 
development of new theories and the prediction of the possible 
outcome of experiments. It is difficult to see a similar
role for models in theology. Partly it is because they are 
within the unidirectionality of time in a way models in science 
are not, for I can repeat an experiment in science but there 
is no equivalent means of repeating a religious experience. 
Yet is also is recognised that there are models in science 
which are not derived from the results of repeatable experiments, 
e.g. models in cosmology, so again there is not a clear 
demarcation.
There is, however, a different kind of predictive role in 
theology in the sense that some models are used to suggest
possible divine-human relationships in the future and give 
ways in which we (and God) will behave, or to indicate the
probable consequence of present actions. This role is about 
relationships and this is different from the role in science. 
Creativity and imagination Many of the models in theology 
are dealing with those areas of human life that are difficult 
or even impossible to quantify — the poetic, the imaginative,
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the creative, the numinous or the emotional. . There may be 
no doubts about the reality and the universality of religious 
experience but it cannot be measured in a scientific way 
or repeated as in an experiment! While it is recognised 
that models in science involve the creative and the imaginative
aspects of human thinking, the aim is rather different.
At its simplest it could be said that science deals with 
the objective, theology with the subjective but immediately 
examples can be given to contradict that. Probably it is 
best to see a continuum from objective to subjective and
to see that part of the function of models is in a creative
and imaginative use within that continuum.
For there are times when a scientist responds in a subjective 
way both in the physical and human sciences and is more involved 
in the models than is often assumed and theologians would 
claim that there is an objective reference in their studies. 
As examples are studied it will become clearer that there
can be much valuable interplay between models in science
and theology which is both creative and useful. (see appendix 1) 
LIMITATIONS
There are limitations to the use of models in theology as 
there are to those in science and these limitations are similar
in both, for example, literalism, inversion and the recognition
of the nature of the relationship between model and modelled. 
The very human desire for certainity often leads to a literalism 
which fails to take into account the is/is not character 
of models.
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Literalism can take a number of forms when the models in 
theology are considered and it can be a more extensive problem 
here than for scientists. In the Old Testament there is 
a continuing concern which is reflected in the laws prohibiting 
idolatory; the people were forbidden to make physical representa­
tions of God as objects for worship, i.e. in present day 
language, not to make models. Although it must be recognised 
that there are no prohibitions against verbal images, indeed 
there is a wealth of these in the Bible. One factor in the 
concern about idolatory was that there be no inclusion of 
influences from the religions of Israel's neighbours.
Today perhaps the problem is the mental pictures some people 
have as a result of thinking in a literal way; the inadequate 
or misleading ideas which can lead to a crude view of God 
as 'the old man with a beard who lives in the sky'. This 
may seem extreme but at a more general level there are problems 
with the model of God as father, for this is not to identify
God with earthly fathers but rather to say that there are
characteristics of the experience and understanding of people 
in their ' family relationships which can provide the basis 
of the model. A different aspect of literalism is seen in 
some of the extreme fundamentalist views as expressed in 
'creationist' arguments. Here is found a literal understanding 
of the first chapters of Genesis which is seen at odds with
the understanding, of the origins of the earth from all other
evidences available.
There is another.- limitation which is referred to as inversion. 
The model instead of reflecting and illuminating those aspects
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the relationship, for example between God and persons 
which are like father/child is used to insist that human 
fathers have a divine right to dominate. The focus thus 
being on only one aspect of a model and restricting the analogies 
rather than recognising the potential in the neutral analogies 
for many interpretations.
In some instances one model becomes so dominant that it is 
seen as the only possible model, for example, the monarchical 
one of God which dominated theology for many years and ledd
to authoritarian views of government. A dominant model is
difficult to replace and a 'revolution' may be required before 
it can be demoted. (see the next chapter) These limitations 
do raise questions about the interpretation and how a community 
or individual recognises orthodoxy or even if there ever
can be an agreed view.
SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES
Some of the similarities and differences have already been 
considered in the discussion so far and these will be now 
further developed.
Similarities There is much similarity in the use, status
and characteristics of models in science and theology. Barbour
has summarised it thus "First .... they are analogical
in origin, extensible to new situations and comprehensible 
as units. Second, they have similar status. Neither is
a literal picture of reality, yet neither should be treated 
as a useful fiction. Models are partial and inadequate ways 
of imagining what is not observable. They are symbolic 
representations, for particular purposes of aspects of reality
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which are not directly accessible to us. They are taken 
seriously but not literally. Third, the use of scientific 
models to order observations has some parallels in the use 
of religious models to order the experience of individuals 
and communities. Organising images help us to structure 
and interpret patterns of events in personal life and in 
the world." (6) This last function is an important aspect.
This century has seen a dramatic growth in information in 
every branch of life, particularly in science but also in 
psychology and sociology which affect the understanding of 
theology. Models enable new knowledge to be integrated into 
present knowledge. Although models in theology mainly originate 
out of experience and history and those in science mainly 
out of experiment and observation both have this same integrating 
function. The integration of new knowledge into present 
knowledge involves interpretation and there is often an interplay 
between interpretation and integration which is part of the 
dynamic aspect of models as well as emphasising the importance 
of their neutral analogy. The identification and recognition 
of the types of analogy (positive, negative or neutral) has 
already been noted.
Models in science and theology depend for some of their effect­
iveness on their ability to provide a focus for the imagination 
for in both there is much that is not directly observable. 
Increasingly it is realised that science has a place for 
a creative imagination which was not always recognised in 
the past. The understanding of science that developed in 
the seventeenth century was mechanistic and deterministic
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and this view lasted to this century and it discouraged imagination 
Yet in modern physics and astronomy the scientist is working 
with that which is often not directly observable (no one 
has seen a black hole or an atom). To convey the knowledge 
the scientist uses imagination to make connections, to see 
analogies and so suggest models. This creative imaginative 
aspect is similar to that in theology where the experience
of God who is not seen is expressed in models. Similar historical 
problems are part of the ethos of seventeenth and eighteenth 
century Protestantism which also had little place for imagination 
or symbolism. It could be that the present increased use 
of models in theology is a way of restoring the balance and 
as in science the imagination will again be valued. Imaginative 
thinking provides models but also models lead to creative 
thinking, through the recognition of the neutral analogy.
In both areas an awareness of the neutral and negative analogy 
is vital for new thinking.
Science and theology are both communal activities each with
their own paradigms. Paradigm is used in the sense given
by Kuhn "Paradigm ....... stands for the entire constellation
of beliefs, values, techniques and so on shared by the members 
of a given community." (7) In such a paradigm community
models provide a common means of communication and interpretation. 
There is a qualitative aspect in the ability of models to 
do this. A good model should transcend cultural and national 
barriers and be able to provide a common language for the 
religious or scientific community. The scientist communicates 
the discoveries that are made through the use of models,
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and these can be shared and discussed. Similarly in theology, 
good models enable the sharing of experience and the insights 
of revelation. Their educational and heuristic value in 
both science and theology has already been discussed and 
shown to be of importance in teaching and communication. 
In both cases there is the pragmatic justification for their 
use, they communicate, they are useful but above all they 
work.
In both communities the traditions are transmitted through 
exemplars or foundational models. Barbour says- "A religious 
tradition, like a scientific tradition is transmitted more
by the memory of its exemplars than by a set of explicit
principles. For the Christian community, many incidents
in Christ's life ..... for a scientific community by contrast
a narrower range of incidents such as Newton's experiments 
and ideas in mechanics..." (8) Although, I think that this 
is less so for scientists and there is considerable variation 
in attitudes to the past; for while scientists acknowledge 
their historical roots they are far less committed to them. 
(This will be discussed further in the next chapter) The 
question of whether the models of one community influence 
that of the other will be considered later.
In the next section the differences in the use of models 
will be discussed. One of these is the effect of models
on behaviour or the way of life. However if consideration
is given to other branches of science than the physical sciences, 
there are similarities. Models in medicine and in ecology 
evoke response and direct action in ways much like that of
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models in theology. A mechanistic model of human sickness 
will lead to a doctor treating a person with drugs or surgery. 
Whereas with an holistic one there will be a very different 
approach with a concern for the psychological as well as 
physical causes of illness. In ecology certain models of 
the inter-relationships in nature will lead to action in 
conservation and preservation. These scientific models evoke 
a response and a course of action at a personal level - in 
some cases quite independent of a religious viewpoint - which 
is very similar to the response evoked by those in theology.
Ferre summarises three similarities between the models as 
they are seen in what they do, "First, then, a modelsimplifies
the data at hand .... (with the result that) .... the theologian,
like the scientist is justly grateful for his model. But
both, need to be wary .... a model filters facts .... Third,
that the reliance upon models .... demands that we learn
how to employ an epistemologically immediate conception "without 
being committed to any theory founded on the domaine from 
which that conception is borrowed." " (9)
Whilst many theological models are concerned with the nature 
of God (see I. T. Ramsey), others are concerned with the 
relationships between God and human beings. McFague stresses
this latter function of models to interpret relationships 
and likens it to her observation that "scientific models 
.... focus not on picturing entities but on comparing and 
contrasting processes, relations and structures." (10)
Differences There are many differences between models in 
. science and models in theology. At the most basic level 
it could be said that whereas models in theology interpret
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experience and express and evoke distinctive attitudes and 
allegiances those in science interpret . observation and 
suggest theories which can be tested. However, these differences 
are often a matter of degree than of absolute contrast, except 
that in theology there is no equivalent to the scale, structural 
or mathematical models in science. There are also many more 
models in theology illustrative of the complexity and richness 
■of the God/human relationships; these also have an inter­
relatedness with much variety and degrees of concreteness 
as well as abstraction not found in science.
A basic and key difference is that in theology the central 
model is all inclusive and all-embracing in a way that has 
no equivalent in science. This is defined by McFague as 
the original model' or 'model of models' (see reference 
3), and is the model of relationship between God and the 
world. Ferre refers simiarly to a "composite picture, what 
we may call the biblical model of reality; master models 
which are often a panoramic mosaic picture of reality."
(11) Theological models invoke a response and a reaction
in the individual and in the community. They involve God/person 
and person/person relationships that are expressed emotionally, 
practically and socially, and can affect the lifestyle and 
life orientation of individuals and groups. Models in the 
physical sciences have none of this in their use; although 
it has been indicated there is some similarity with those 
from the medical and ecological fields. It could be said 
that there is a similarity between models in theology and
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science since they both involve commitment but the commitments 
are of a different kind. Theological models involve personal 
commitments in relationship. The scientist is committed 
to models as the means of ordering knowledge and in their 
ability to provoke new ideas, but not in any personal sense. 
This is not to suggest that there is not a personal commitment
among scientists for often there is valuable and productive
commitment among members of say a research group but it is 
of a different kind. It is also noted here that if models
of science were being considered then it would need to be 
recognised that they very much affect attitudes. There is
no real equivalent in science- of the role-model in theology. 
Role-models have an important place in theology, chiefly 
in the patterning of an individuals life on the that of the
model of Christ or of other significant individuals. Communally 
this is expressed in the model of the church as the family 
of God. Models of God lead to worship, the outward expression
of the relationship of a person to God. Kuhn and others have
discussed the role of community paradigms in scientific communities, 
and these in some respects are similar to the role-models
of theology but the difference is in what is modelled.
The nearest scientists may come to the experience of worship
in respect of their models could be the sense of awe that
may be present in the face of the vastness of space, in the
models of cosmology.
The personal aspect of models in theology is seen in their
effect on and direction of, behaviour in the believer. Models
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in the physical sciences are concerned with discovery amd 
systematic structures and do not affect behaviour. Again,, 
this has to be modified in respect of the human sciences, 
where, as has been mentioned for example in medicine, models 
do affect behaviour. Although in this area the model is 
limited to a particular area of life and is not all-embracing 
as the theological models.
The second key difference is to be seen in the status of 
the respective models. Models are basic and essential in 
theology, they provide the explanation of abstract concepts 
and enable experience to be interpreted. Ferre has claimed 
"The model is a necessary condition of theological theory."
(12) It is claimed that theology could not operate nowadays 
without models ; and this seems to be a reasonable claim because 
as has already been stated that this is how concepts and 
experience are communicated and the observation of the development 
of model language out of metaphorical/symbolic language. 
The situation is different in the physical sciences, and 
there is considerable debate about the necessity of models. 
It has already been noted that there are those who claim 
that they are "useful fictions" in the interim but eventually 
a situation is reached where they can be discarded, for at 
that point explanation is complete and expressed in say, 
a mathematical statement or a particular law. The more general 
view is that models have a useful and constructive value 
but they are not essential in the sense of theological models. 
The value of models in science has already been discussed 
in chapter two.
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To summarise, models in theology are generally more comprehensive, 
inclusive and behaviour-directing, whereas those in science 
are more specific and limited; for example, the model of 
the atom reflects models of the planetary system but that 
is the extent of the influence and it is not applied elsewhere. 
Although there are those revolutionary scientific models 
which have significantly influenced the world-picture, such 
as the mechanistic models of Newton and the relativistic
ones of Einstein.
Theological models also support many metaphors, e.g. the
model of God as Father implies that human beings are God's 
children and that provides models of family relationships
(both good and bad). In science there is not this metaphorical
relationship, models are more localised and limited in application. 
The differences can be expressed also in terms of quantitative 
and qualitative properties of models. Science is concerned 
with the observation and evaluation of phenomena, basically 
the questions asked are ■ "how" and "why", the connections
are between persons and objects. It is quantitative and
question of values are not normally relevant. Models in 
theology are concerned with meaning and value and therefore
the qualitative aspects of experience, and the connections
are between person and person or person and God. In the
end there can be no final and clear cut agreements or distinction
In the ways that the models are used there are different
levels of understanding which defy clear demarcation. As 
a generalisation it can be said that models in theology tend 
to be more permanent and resist change whereas those in science 
are more readily discarded and replaced; the way in which 
models can and do change will be considered in the next 
chapters.
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WHAT MAKES A GOOD MODEL?
In chapter two this question was asked about models in science 
and what was said there also applies to those in theology. 
A good model, as Pittenger suggests "must stand up to knowledge 
from many fields of expertise, must be capable of being imagina­
tively grasped and it must be engaging of the total personality 
of those who accept it." (13) The models must have internal 
consistency, be comprehensive, and be appropriate in the 
context of the parts of theology being studied. A good model 
will elicit a positive response enabling sense to be made 
of individual and communal religious experience and knowledge. 
A significant feature of a good model is the extent of its 
neutral analogy, so that new connections are seen, creative 
insights encouraged with an openess to further exploration, 
productive of new ideas so that significant new trains of 
thought result. There are many examples of this in theology, 
one being the model of the Spirit as "the wind", with all 
the wealth of images provoked by the exploration of the varied 
experience of wind; it is felt not seen yet its effect can 
be observed, a gale compared to a breeze etc. It is recognised 
that in this study the models are those in Christian theology 
and therefore the criteria for assessing a good model is 
within that context and does not take in account different 
cultures and religions.
THE BIBLICAL MODELS OF CREATOR AND CREATION
In order to illustrate the use of models in theology at this 
stage in the discussion I will focus on the Biblical understanding
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of creation and God as creator, and to show how model language 
can be applied to this theme. (a) (The scientific models 
of creation will be discussed with other related topics in 
chapter six.) It is recognised that other religions and
cultures have their own models of creation and also that
there continues among Biblical scholars much discussion of 
the external influences on the Biblical texts, but this is 
not being included here.
An overview of the Biblical texts raises an immediate difference
between theological and scientific models of creation and
that is in respect of the time scales involved. The Old
Testament grew out of a long oral tradition, and the written
record covers many centuries. There are many strands and
layers in the writing . and it is difficult to make a definitive
chronological scheme of the development of the models of
creation. The development of the scientific ones in comparison
is much clearer, more recent and in a much briefer time scale.
Furthermore, the Bible does not offer a view of creation
as a separate doctrinal or philosophical statement which
can be set alongside and compared with modern scientific
statements. For the writers of the Bible, there are no credal
statements about God as creator, since for them there was
no alternative. Westermann makes this point strongly, "the
Old Testament notion of belief presumes the possibility of
an alternative .... an alternative to belief in creation
(a) I would emphasise that what is being attempted is 
the application of the use of model language in the 
ways already discussed.
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or creator is quite unthinkable. The creation of the world
IS not an object of belief but a presupposition for thought."
(14) Therefore the models of creator/creation have to
be accepted in that context and are not open to revision 
in the sense that scientific ones are revised. The biblical 
conviction is of God as creator and the creation as God's 
sphere of action, and many models are used to express this,
as will be shown.
It was partly their experience of the natural world by the
people of the Old Testament that led them to their convictions 
of God as creator. Their observation of, for example, storms 
or earthquakes led to reflection and to the interpretation
and expression in some of the models of creator/creation.
This "method" has some parallels in science but the scientific 
method and the models that result come by a different route.
The scientific models assume the reality of creation, as
do the religious models but the latter also involve the concept 
of revelation as well as observation and they also are based 
on the presupposition that this reality is not self-explanatory. 
In all the models of creator/creation there is one connecting 
and pervasive theme which can be summarised thus, that there 
is a moral, ethical and practical relationship between creator 
and created. God has concern for all of creation and, in
particular, for humankind, because it is God's creation. 
In response humankind should offer worship and live lives 
in recognition of this fact. The acceptance of God as creator 
grew out of historical experience and is an implication, of 
their understanding of salvation history. There is nothing
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similar in the physical sciences to this response although 
as it has already been noted in some other disciplines such 
as medicine and ecology models can be seen to affect moral
attitudes and action. The theological models of the Old 
Testament are not a response to philosophical enquiries about 
origins. Westermann has argued forcefully that they are 
rather a response to a threatening environment. He says 
"It was not the philosopher inquiring about his origins that 
spoke in the Creation narratives; it was man threatened by 
his surroundings. The background was an existential not
an intellectual problem." (15) The scientific models are 
therefore very different to the religious models in this 
, respect, partly because they come out of a different intellect­
ual and cultural environment. As nature ceased to be existentially 
threatening then the leisure for its dispassionate study 
arose. In the earlier discussion, it was emphasised that
it is important to recognise the negative aspects of all 
models. There are limitations to any model in the recognition 
of what they are not representing. This is particularly 
true in theological models and is expressed in the biblical 
tradition in the prohibitions against idolatory. The models
of creator/creation are varied and are often expressed in 
poetic language, but always the inference is of that which
is beyond description and sometimes to the limits of human 
understanding and imagination. This is equally true of scientific 
models of creation. There is also in the biblical tradition
a rejection of certain models found in other traditions,
such as the dualistic ones of some religions. This . raises
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the question of how models come to be accepted by a community, 
both scientific and religious communities would seem to be 
selective. The models of one community can well be different 
to those of another and there is then the matter of how they 
change. These questions of acceptance and how models change 
will be considered in the context of Kuhn's work in later 
chapters.
The models of creator and creation in the Bible show a richness 
and comprehensiveness which is not found with the scientific 
models which are more specific to a theory and therefore more 
limited. Also the religious models are used together, to 
reinforce and emphasise the theme and in a way which encourages 
the imagination. This as has been shown makes classification 
more difficult, for the reasons already given.
B. W. Anderson has indicated that there is much debate about 
the earliest understanding of God as creator and whether 
God was even originally for the Jewish people a creator deity. 
It is difficult to know what is read back into earlier ideas. 
He argues that the earlier traditions were of God as creator 
of a people rather than of the cosmos, an idea that came 
later. "In the Mosaic tradition, mythopoeic creation language 
is used to speak of the creation of a people who are given 
identity and vocation. In the royal covenant tradition, 
the language functions to show that the mundane social order 
is stable and wholesome by virtue of its relationship to 
the created order of the cosmos. And in Israelite wisdom 
initially sponsored by the royal court, the language expresses 
cosmological interest in God's past and present activity." (16)
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Thus in general, Biblical scholars agree that the understanding 
of God as creator and the nature of the creation was not 
a response to questions of origins but came out of the experiences 
of the people. It was the experience of salvation in the 
history of the people of the Old Testament (particularly 
in the Exodus), their understanding of covenant as well as 
their observation and experience of ordinary life and the 
natural world that led to the development of the statements 
about the God who created all that is and continues to be 
active in his creation. Thus it is clear that the models 
of creation in theology developed from a very different perspective 
from those in science, and have a different status. Some 
of the biblical material will next be reviewed and in chapter 
six I will continue the discussion about models in science 
and in the history of Christian theology which are relevant 
to the theme.
SPECIFIC EXAMPLES
It is implicit in the biblical tradition that God is creator 
and is involved with the creation in such a way that it is 
not possible to consider the one without the other. Also 
in this study I am using the word creation in the dynamic 
not static sense. There is a strand in theology - the static - 
which stresses that the work of creation was completed in 
the beginning ,
And on the seventh day God finished his work which he had 
done (Genesis 2 v.2). The static models have their value
in the reinforcing and maintaining of a stable society. 
Stability can well enable people to be at peace and to be 
secure.
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Yet there are other strands - the dynamic - which emphasise
the continuing work of God in creation which will reach its
culmination in the new creation at the end of time. It is
recognised that this touches on the nature of God's providence 
but the relation of that to the present topic is outwith 
the scope of this discussion. Moltmann is one who has emphasised 
that creation is a 'process'. "It follows from this that 
theology must talk about creation not only in the beginning, 
but also in history and at the end. That is to say, we must
have in view the total process of divine activity.......
If theology wants to sum up God's creative activity, then 
it must view Creation as the still open, creative process 
of reality." (17) God not only created in the beginning
but continues to sustain that which was created. The first 
chapter of Genesis sets this dependence in the context of 
origins. Anderson states "the Genesis story portrays the 
radical dependence of the cosmic order upon the transcendent 
Creator .... The cosmos is not eternal and self-perpetuating 
as Greek philosophers maintained: it is sustained in being
by the Creator." (18)
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It has been noted that there is a rich diversity . in the 
models of creator/creation in the Bible and these can be 
grouped under various headings but clear demarcation is not 
possible since there is much overlap in concepts. Some of 
these will now be identified.
The model of sustaining creator is found in many places including 
the Psalms (Psalm 104) and Job (38-41). Thus in the book 
of Job there is a long passage where the Lord in a series 
of rhetorical questions speaks of how the world has been 
sustained since the beginning of time. It is a model whose 
purpose is to lead to worship of the creator and recognition 
of dependence. "When I look at the heavens, the work of 
thy fingers ... What is man that thou art mindful of him 
... 0 Lord, our Lord, how majestic is thy name in all the
earth!" (Psalm 8.V.3, 4 and 9). The model is also of a creator
who not only sustains but cares for the creation (Psalm 33,
Psalm 146, v. 5-7, Isaiah 40, Isaiah 42 v. 5-7). This is
expressed in personal terms, within the context of the created 
order, "As a father pities his children, so the Lord, pities 
those that fear him." (Psalm 103 v.l3), or a mother cares
for her baby (Isaiah 49 v.l5). In respect of earlier comments 
about the model of God as father it is worth noting the use
of a feminine model.
The model of the continuing creative activity of God is also 
found frequently throughout the Old Testament particularly 
in the Psalms and in Isaiah. Various biblical scholars have 
pointed out that in Hebrew, the language is expressed far
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less in noun concepts and rather more in verbs which are 
active and the thought is expressed in dynamic, vigorous, 
and personal terms, with metaphor and analogy used widely, 
(a) This continuing activity of the creator is vividly expressed 
in the passages already quoted as well as in Genesis (1 and 2) 
and parts of Isaiah.
Another model of creation is that it is purposeful, for example, 
the creator formed the earth to be inhabited (Isaiah 45 v.18-19). 
This is seen particularly in the first account of creation
in Genesis 1, with its refrain 'it was good', for the word 
good in this context means fit for the purpose. This model
has a particular use in that it provides a basis for the 
claim that human life has a purpose and meaning in a way 
that is not found in scientific models.
There are also the monarchical models of God as creator, 
the one who is ruler and lord over all that is, God rules
over the natural world which is part of creation, "0 Lord 
God of hosts, who is mighty as thou art .... Thou dost rule
the raging of the sea .... The heaven is thine, the earth
also is thine ..." (Psalm 89 v.8-14), also Job 9 v.4-10.
God rules over the Israelite people and is active in their 
history as for example in the Exodus (Exodus 15) but also 
in other nations ( .Isaiah 45 v.5-6). This model has had a great 
influence on attitudes to authority and has been used at
(a) e.g. Westermann in "What does the Old Testament 
say about God" (S.P.O.K. London 1979)
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times to justify the authoritarian rule of kings and emperors. 
The models need to be taken together to avoid the limitations 
of literalism and absolutism which have already been discussed. 
Macquarrie makes a simpler division of the models in his 
discussion of creation (a) and gives two; the first being 
the model of making, the second the model of emanation.
The model of God as 'maker' sums up the Biblical models,
it has its origins in Genesis "God saw everything he had
made and behold it was very good" (Genesis 1 v.31) as well
as elsewhere. The analogy is partly that of a craftsman
who has made that which is fit for its purpose but also that 
of the artist who is intimately and emotionally involved
in the making of that created. This model stresses the transcend­
ence "Of God. In addition the model of "making", is often 
seen in terms : of God the Father, but it has to be recognised 
that the theological models of creation have to take in account 
Trinitarian doctrine. The model of 'emanation' although
less directly Biblical stresses the immanence of God and 
can be inferred from the changing concepts of wisdom in the
Bible and the understanding of the work of the Holy Spirit. 
In the Wisdom literature of the Old Testament and the Apocrypha 
it is possible to discern aspects of the descriptions of wisdom 
for which the language of models is appropriate. There is 
the model of Divine Wisdom who is active in creation, giving
(a) J. Macquarrie - Principles of Christian 
Theology (S.C.M. London 1977)
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giving meaning and purpose and is personified. R. S. • Barbour 
describes it thus "It is a metaphysical entity, or a mythical 
entity, but also a recognizable moral characteristic of
human beings" and "Many metaphors and similies describe this 
nature and activity of Wisdom .... master-workmen .... pattern
or blueprint of creation --- light ___ tree." (19) Words
to which the term model can suitably be applied.
The process by which the features of Old Testament wisdom 
became connected with the concept of. word are complex and 
are debated by scholars but the general concensus is that 
in the prologue to the Gospel of John the two are united 
and seen as applying to the person of Christ (a). In the 
New Testament there are the seeds of the Trinitarian doctrine
which would come to fruition in later centuries and would 
include the doctrine of creation.
In the New Testament the concept of God as creator is generally 
implicit rather than explicit and continues the developments 
of the Old Testament understanding of creator/creation.
In Paul's speech to the Athenians (Acts 17 v.22-30), the 
model is of the God who is creator and sustainer of all life 
from the beginning. The development of the ideas and understanding 
of the meaning and purpose of the coming of Christ into the world 
can be seen in the way the models of God from the Old Testament 
are applied to Christ, (1 Corinthians 8 v.6, Colossians 1
16, John 1 V.3, 10). How much this application can
(a) e.g. R.S. Barbour and A. Heron in Creation, 
Christ and Culture (T. & T. Clark, Edinburgh
1976)
68
be described as revolutionary will be discussed later in 
more detail but it can be argued from the evidence of the 
New Testament and . all the developments of Christology, that 
the final and ultimate model is to be seen in the person 
of Christ.
I have attempted to give some general indication of how models 
can be used in the interpretation of the biblical understanding 
of God as creator and of the creation to illustrate the theme.
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CHAPTER FIVE
HOW DO MODELS CHANGE?
In the previous chapters I have already touched on the important 
question in the use and understanding of models - how they 
change or are changed. The study of the history of science 
can show this to be the case, the changes in the cosmological 
models being one example among many, and I have also indicated 
that models in theology also change. The examples of change 
are many and various and specific examples will be explored 
in greater detail in the next chapter.
When the limitations in the uses of models were being discussed 
a number of problems were identified. It was observed that 
some models did not change, particularly when a model becomes 
so identified with its source that thinking becomes 'strait- 
jacketed' and the acquisition of new knowledge is restricted
and no change seems possible ( e.g. the refusal to accept
the heliocentric view in cosmology on alleged scientific
and theological grounds). Progress in science, which is
a- response to and reflection of the understanding and interpret­
ation of new knowledge will require the replacement of old 
models by new ones. Sometimes a model just ceases to be 
used, it becomes redundant and is quietly forgotten ( e.g. 
the Phlogiston theory of chemists). However it is more 
usual for the change to be more dramatic and involve the 
discarding of one model and its replacement by a new and 
fundamentally different one. The changes are in some instances 
so extensive that they can only be described as revoluntionary. 
This is true for sciencê, and it is possibly true for theology. 
The discussion is not if models change but how they change.
T. S. Kuhn has made a significant contribution to this whole
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discussion. In his book "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" 
he makes the claim for the revolutionary nature of the changes 
in science. His book has been productive of a considerable 
literature and discussion among scientists and philosophers.
1 find his general argument persuasive and it has provided
a useful starting point in this particular study for hew
models change. Many have expressed reservations about some 
of his arguments and conclusions and this is a continuing 
debate. In a way his thesis can be likened to a good model
for it encourages new thinking, new ideas and he could become 
his own example if a new model for the way things change 
is proposed!
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS - reviewed
Kuhn starts his study by looking at the history of science 
and its influence on the present day understanding of the
scientific endeavour. Science is mostly represented by 
what he calls 'normal science' and this normal science proceeds
by the accumulation of facts, theories and methods and this 
is reflected in the textbooks. The basis of normal science 
is that the scientific community presumes it knows what 
the world is like and there is general resistance to change. 
Kuhn then introduces the term paradigm which is a keyword 
in his argument and which has a number of definitions.
In the postscript to his book he recognises this and makes 
clearer his use of the term. Basically it is used in two 
different senses and Kuhn defines these as follows, "On
the one hand, it stands for the whole constellation of beliefs, 
values, techniques and so on shared by members of a given
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community. . On the other, it denotes one sort of element 
in that constellation, the concrete puzzle-solutions which 
employed as models or examples can replace explicit rules 
for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science."(1’ 
Thus paradigm refers to both the content of science and 
the communal function of those scientists, and so provides 
the basis for the pursuit or normal science. In some uses 
of the term he would seem to see models as paradigms, "Scientists 
work through models acquired through education and through 
subsequent exposure to the literature often without quite 
knowing or needing to know what characteristics have given 
these models the status of community paradigms." (2) The 
sense in which he uses the term model seems to reflect some 
of the ambiguity that surrounds paradigm. Problems arise 
in normal science when discoveries are made which cannot 
be accommodated by contemporary theories or anomalies arise 
in an experiment which cannot be accounted for from previous
experience. It is at this point that there is often a
proliferation of theories and the associated problems of
articulation which bring about a situation of crisis. Kuhn 
argues that the response to this crisis situation within
normal science is varied, from .the rearguard action that 
seeks security in the established paradigm to the willing 
acceptance of a new paradigm. There will be in some instances 
the recognition of anomaly and this results in many divergent 
solutions which can lead to an experience of confusion.
The resolution of the crisis needs a reconstruction, a new 
way of 'seeing', a transition to a new paradigm in short, 
a revolution.
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The second half of Kuhn's book explores the nature of these
scientific revolutions. He argues that they are "non-cumulative
developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced
in whole or part by an incompatible new one." (3) The
choice between conflicting paradigms is a choice between
incompatible modes of community life. In the end there
is the need to change the meaning of established and familiar
concepts to new and different ones and this creates the
problem of the relationship between old and new paradigms.
He says "the normal—scientific tradition that emerges from
a scientific revolution is not only incompatible but often
actually incommensurable with that which has gone before." (4)
He sees this as the essence of the revolution and it will
involve conflict and the re—education of the scientists
perception. That which was seen in the context of the previous
paradigm is now seen in an entirely new way, and this is
likened to a 'gestaltswitch'. The difficulty in such a
situation is the problem of how this is communicated for
the meaning of words is changed and there is breakdown in
communication. In the revolutionary experience there is
no resort to a 'neutral language'. Kuhn argues convincingly
that revolutions do occur but the process by which the new
replaces the old is less clear. He raises the question
of* verification and falsification of theories and elaborates
more on his understanding of incommensurability between
old and new paradigms. He justifies this in a number of
ways including the different use of language (e.g. 'curved'
space in Einstein's theory of relativity), the different
world views (e.g. before and after Copernicus), and the
different problems to be solved and the different standards
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and definitions. The new paradigm will succeed as it is 
able to solve problems, make positive predictions and enable 
science to continue to be practised. Revolutions cause 
turmoil and discomfort mentally but enable progress to be 
made and creativity to flourish.
SOME COMMENTS ON KUHN
The critics of Kuhn raise many points including the question 
of how often revolutions do occur, the meaning of incommensurable, 
and the tensions between developmental and revolutionary 
views. An initial and personal response was to note how 
he often uses language which is religious with his concepts 
of conversion and faith. The resistance of some scientists 
to change seemed familiar to those who reject change in 
religious matters ! It could well be that in these ways 
some connections can be made between scientific and theological 
models and Kuhn's argument can be applied to both disciplines. 
For example he says "Scientists then often speak of the 
"scales falling from their eyes" or of the "lightening flash" 
that "inundates" a previously obscure puzzle, enabling its 
components to be seen in a new way that for the first time 
permits its solution." (5) Also "1 would argue, rather 
that in these matters neither proof nor error is at issue. 
The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is 
a conversion experience that cannot be forced." (6) Religious 
language indeed!
If* Kuhn is right then he has illustrated very well the way 
in which models can change and that way is often revolutionary, 
the old model is discarded and new put in its place. It 
could be said, though, that he has chosen his examples carefully 
illustrate his argument, which of course is reasonable
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but it does leave other questions unanswered. Another difficulty 
with his view is that it seems to reject the idea that there 
can be any connection between the old and the new. Yet 
it can surely be said that the 'seeds' of any revolution
will be found in what went before, no revolution, be it
in politics, religion or science is without a history.
His views continue to be controversial and only some points
can be considered here which are relevant to this study;
these will be commented on in a general way here and further 
developed in the next chapter.
(i) Models which do not change.
The development of models in certain subjects can lead to 
those which are unlikely to change. This seems particularly 
true of mathematically based models and some of the structural 
models in the physical sciences. Developments in modern 
instrumentation has led to greater accuracy and more precise : 
measurements but the models remain the same and continue
to have universal application, (e.g. in the structural models 
of chemistry greater accuracy leads to refinements in say 
bond lengths but not to change in structure.) This is also
true in much of modern technology for engineers will base 
their work on Newtonian mechanics for at this level they 
are appropriate; whereas the atomic physicist uses quantum
mechanical standards. (The question for Kuhn is not about 
practical applications but if Newton's dynamics can be derived 
from relativistic dynamics or if they are incommensurable.)
There are instances where as a result of new* discoveries 
entirely new models can be proposed, which are not derived
or related to earlier models, they are novel not revolutionary, 
(e.g. the models of some aspects of brain function in terms 
of computers).
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(ii) Incommensurability.
There has been much controversy over Kuhn's use of this 
term. He has stated that in a revolution there is no neutral 
standard for the comparison of paradigms and there are
no rules by which it is possible to prove that one paradigm
is superior to another. "It is the scientific communities 
judgement which is the ultimate locus of sciences rational
authority." (7) This emphasis on the community by Kuhn
has been seen by some of his critics as irrational. Yet
this emphasis on the community has a wider significance
for the use of models than for science alone for it is also 
applicable to theological models. Kuhn, it seems to me 
also recognises the psychological situation, which may 
be at variance from that of the strictly logical viewpoint.
Another difficulty is whether there is a qualitative judgement 
involved in a change of models, and this is another aspect 
of incommensurability. In some cases it may well be that
a new model is better than the old, but very often they
deal with different questions and so a judgement cannot 
be made. From a pragmatic and educational view it is the 
model which is most universally able to convey what the
scientist wishes to say that could be said to be the best.
This raises the question of relativism and is part of the 
criticism made of Kuhn, yet it is because he is attempting 
to articulate the actual experience of scientists rather 
than establish a basis for qualitative judgements. Incommensurable 
is more of a comment on the inability of groups to communicate
than on what is communicated. R. G. Bernstein has discussed
this problem and looked at the various arguments and basically
he supports Kuhn. He stresses that it is necessary to distinguish
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between incompatibility, incommensurability and incomparability, 
since they are not synonymous. He writes "In summary we 
can say that for Kuhn rival paradigm theories are logically 
incompatible (and therefore, really in conflict with each 
other); incommensurable (and therefore, they cannot always 
be measured against each other point-by-point); and comparable 
(capable of being compared with each other in multiple ways 
without requiring the assumption that there is or must 
always be a common fixed grid by which we measure progress)."
(8) This is useful when looking at how theological models 
change, for in say the incarnation of Christ it can be claimed 
that there is a revolution in models to which the language 
of incommensurability seems appropriate.
(iii) Development or revolution.
Kuhn can seem dismissive of the place of culmulative change 
in science. His chosen examples are mainly for the physical 
sciences and do illustrate his argument for revolution. 
Yet in all revolutions in whatever area there are certainly 
some continuities, e.g. a political revolution can significantly 
change the direction of a society but there will be continuities^ 
(^ t^here is always something from previous history present 
in the present.
In many instances the evidence is that models change gradually 
as new information is obtained and it is only in retrospect 
that changes can be identified. Yet even when the change 
is rightly described as revolutionary there will be development 
before and after that event. In the end it is not a matter 
of either/or rather a matter of both/and. Thus two parallel
schemata can be identified to show how models change:—
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old model ________  development ______________ new model
old model _________ revolution ______________  new model
Perhaps part of the difficulty is that the term 'revolutionary'
makes it seem that something traumatic and on a large scale
is taking place in a short space of time whereas some of
the revolutions are small scale, limited in scope, and in
some instances over a long time scale. It has been commented
that theiCopernican revolution took 150 years to complete.
THE APPLICATION OF KUHN'S THESIS TO MODELS IN THEOLOGY
In the discussion of Kuhn's work it has already been noted
that his ideas have been widely applied and are being applied
to models in theology. It is therefore appropriate to consider
further if revolutions do occur to these and in particular
the models of creation/creator. There are very real difficultie
in answering this question because of the nature of the
Biblical material and its history. In the first instance
it is easier to see it in development terms; discussion
by theologians is often in terms of the development of concepts
about God throughout the history of the Jewish people and
how that- continued in the Christian era. However there
are crucial events in that history that could be called
revolutionary in their impact on the models. The Exodus
being the key event for the Jewish people; for the memory
of how they had been saved from slavery in Egypt and the
reflection on, and interpretation of the event over the
centuries dominated and directed their religious life in
a way that is revolutionary. It is the time scale that
is part of the problem, the revolution in the models that
occurred took a very long time compared to most scientific
ones. Later experiences also affected the models, the Exile
and the destruction of the Temple and the contacts with
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the Hellenistic world.
The development of the models is continued in the New Testament .• 
and in the teaching of Jesus there is seen an acceptance 
of the models of the past at times. However it is in the 
person of Jesus that there is that which can be called the 
key revolution, because of who He was. He is seen as with 
God in the beginning of creation and in the new creation 
its ultimate explanation. This raises vast questions about 
Christology which are not within the scope of this study 
but it is clear that the perception of God and the understanding 
of the relationship between God and the • world has changed 
dramatically. The way this happened is along the paths 
as indicated by Kuhn, the comments already made about connection 
between old and new are appropriate here.
Kuhn noted that there is often resistance by a community 
to a change in its accepted paradigms and such a resistance 
is very strong in respect of theological models. The community 
of the faithful will resist change and invoke divine revelation 
to justify that resistance. The existence of resistence 
may be indicative of the actuality of a revolution in models! 
This involves the question of the comparison of rival models 
and is part of Kuhn's use of incommensurable. If there 
is no neutral observation language how is it decided which 
model is the 'best' one. Part of the function of a community 
is in the assessment of what makes a good model using the 
criteria already mentioned.
SUMMARY
In answer to the question of how models change I would summarise
it briefly and simply. Some models change by development,
others are discarded (sometimes deliberately, often by neglect)
but there are those for which the change is so total that
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the term revolution is appropriate. Kuhn has shown how that
can happen and his view has wide application. In the next
chapter a number of topics will be considered which it is 
hoped willdemonstrate and illuminate the points raised here 
and in the previous chapters.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONSIDERATION OF SOME TOPICS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE THEME 
Thediscussion so far has been on the understanding and use 
of models in science and theology and the question of how
they change or are changed has been considered in the context 
of T. S. Kuhn's thesis. In this chapter some specific topics
will be considered in greater detail to illustrate the theme
and to show how this can be applied. The four topics to
be considered are : -
1. , Cosmological models from early times to Kepler, which
includes a consideration of the Copernican revolution. Models 
of Status.
2. Models of origins of the earth, a study of the genesis/geology 
debate.
3. More recent understanding of origins and status including
the present theories of cosmology.
4. Further Biblical and theological aspects.
All these are vast topics in content, time and complexity;
what I am attempting to do is to trace a path through them,
identifying some of the many models, showing how they have 
changed and trying to indicate connections between science 
and theology. To use F. Ferre's analogy of maps, this is 
a route plan rather than a large scale Ordnance Survey map. 
There are times when the distinction between theology and 
science is not clear, at other times there are no connections 
and, of course, there are the noted times of controversy 
between the two.
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1, COSMOLOGICAL MODELS — THE Copernican revolution 
INTRODUCTION
From earliest times humans have observed the stars and astronomy 
was one of the first sciences. The practical need to know
the times and the seasons, the need to navigate on land and 
sea, and the observations of the regularities of nature all 
contributed to a model of the universe. The model enabled 
calculations to be made and it was possible to predict eclipses 
for example. The Greeks two centuries before Christ had
developed a system of astronomy which was able to predict
eclipses and calculate the position of stars and planets. 
Ptolemy is credited with the model in which the earth is 
in the centre and the planets circle around it. This proved 
acceptable for many centuries, since it was seen as being 
aesthetically and religiously pleasing as well as meeting 
the known scientific observations. As time passed and more 
accurate observations were made it was found to need modifica­
tion and more complicated mechanisms were needed to make 
the model fit the theory. In the sixteenth century, Copernicus, 
a mathematician, realised that there was need of a new model 
and he proposed that the sun should be the centre and all 
the planets would orbit it in concentric circles. In the 
early seventeenth century, Galileo used the newly invented 
telescope to investigate Copernicus's theory. His experiments 
led him to agree with the theory although he subsequently 
came in conflict with the church authorities over this helio­
centric view and was persuaded to deny it. The model however
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was soon generally accepted and although modified by Kepler 
is still that in use today. This model of the solar system 
remains although modern measurement has improved beyond the 
imagining of the scientists of the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, it serves us well and has enabled the modern space 
exploration to proceed. Astronauts can go into space and 
the Voyager space mission to the planets is possible on the 
basis of this model.
Development of models. In the discussion of the Biblical 
models the point was made that there are difficulties in 
tracing the development of the concepts and of recognising 
revolutions partly because of the long time-soales and the 
difficulty of knowing how much is read back into the'accounts. 
The same questions arise when looking at the other cosmological 
models, particularly those from other cultures such as that 
of ancient Greece. The history of astronomy from the earliest 
times to that of Ptolemy shows many strands with many models 
being proposed; for this was a time of development in scientific 
observation and calculation. The Greeks achieved a great 
deal in the eight centuries from 600 B. G. and their astronomy 
was dominant until the middle ages. Their philosophy was 
closely inter-related with their science and this was to 
have a significant influence on Christian theology.
Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) being one of the most influential
of the philosophers. He linked theory with observation and 
produced a model of the earth as a sphere. P. Moore says 
"Moreover, he gave three experimental proofs. First, he 
reasoned that a sphere is 'the shape that a body naturally
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assumes when all parts of it tend toward the centre ' - a
first glimmer of the idea of gravitation. Secondly, he pointed 
out that the stars appear to change in height above or below 
the horizon according to the observer's position on the earth
  something which is only expected if the Earth is a
globe. Thirdly, he drew attention to eclipses of the Moon. 
As the Earth's shadow on the Moon is curved, it follows that 
the surface of the Earth must be curved." (1)
During this period Plato was also at work, his philosophical 
ideas were to have a great influence on subsequent thought. 
He did not study astronomy but from his reasoning he concluded 
that "the shape of the world must be a perfect sphere, and 
that all motion must be in perfect circles at uniform 
speed." (2) Here is an example of a model derived from
theory allied to a philosophical understanding of perfection. 
This concept was to dominate thinking and is still to be 
seen in the early work of Kepler at the end of the sixteenth 
century. In 1596 he published his book, the "Mysterium 
Cosmographicum" where he suggested that the universe is built 
around the five regular solids of geometry. In these all 
the faces can be inscribed and circumscribed by a sphere. 
The model is complex and is an example of an attempt to use 
models to fit a philosophical theory for Kepler was a religious 
man with a theological background and in this work he desired 
to show the perfection of God to be reflected in the perfection 
of God's creation (see Appendix 2). Kepler was a brilliant 
theorist but he was not an observer and and so this model
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is based only on theory and would later be discarded. Throughout 
this long period there does not seem to be any indication 
of a Kuhnian type of revolution, rather there was a gradual 
development in the ideas which reached their culmination, 
in the model of the universe proposed by Ptolemy (120-180) 
which would last until the time of Copernicus. The model 
was earth centered with the planets in circular orbit round 
it. He accepted that since "the circle^ .- is the perfect form 
and nothing short of perfection could be allowed in the heavens
.... (it means) .... all orbits had to be perfectly circular."(3)
However, there was a difficulty for it had been observed 
that theplahets did not move across the skies in a regular 
manner but showed retrograde movement. His solution was 
to assume that a planet moved in its own circle (epicycle) 
the centre of which (the deferent) itself moved round the 
earth in a perfect circle (see diagram in appendix 3).
This modified model met the philosophical requirements of 
the time, i.e. the circularity of all heavenly motion and 
the immobility of the earth at the centre and this ensured 
that the desire for stability and permanence was met. This 
model was concerned with the status of the cosmos only, for 
the Greeks did not apparently ask questions about origins. 
The model worked in a practical way for it supplied the basic 
information that people needed for time-keeping and calenders 
as well as for navigation.
The Copernican revolution. In chapter five I discussed Kuhn's 
thesis and made the point that some revolutions took a long 
time to complete and this is certainly true of this one but
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there can be no doubt that it can be so classified.
Copernicus (1473-1542) had a varied career, he practised 
medicine, was a statesman and a canon of the church. His 
main interest was astronomy, not as an observer but as a 
theorist and most of his work was based on the observations 
of others. While he was still young he began to have doubts 
about the Ptolemaic system and in a short treatise (written 
probably between 1510 and 1514) - The Commentariolus - he
set out his reasons for this and sets out his own system 
in his seven axioms which state that the earth is not the 
centre of the universe but that the sun is and that the earth 
rotates on its own axis. It was not until almost the end 
of his life that he published the book which set out his 
evidence for these views. It has been told that he only 
received the first copy of "De Revolutionibus Orbium Caelestium" 
as he was lying on his deathbed. The revolutionary statement 
is that the earth moves. He provided a comprehensive system 
for how this might be. The consequences of this were vast 
since they affected the ideas of religion and philosophy. 
The conventional wisdom of the time with its origins in Greek 
philosophy was of a stable, unchanging earth which was at 
the centre of the universe. This was also reinforced by
the theological thinking of the time, God had established 
the earth on firm foundations, it could not be moved, it
was at the centre and to suggest differently was not only
heretical but also upset the established political system. 
If the earth revolves around the sun, if it is a planet like
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other planets, if it is not at the centre of the universe,
then where is God in the limitlessness of space (a). It 
was others who developed and consolidated the Copernican 
theory but the revolution had begun with him and is rightly 
called after him. It took some fifty years before the ideas 
became accepted and three men in particular are significant
in this, Kepler, Tycho de Brahe and Galileo, all in different 
ways put the theory on a sound scientific basis.
Consolidation: Kepler (1571—1630) while a student became
convinced that the Copernican system was correct and he tried
to establish a mathematical basis for the system. He was 
a brilliant theorist but he was not an observer and in his
later work he used the observational data of Tycho de Brahe.
As a result of all the turmoil of the Reformation he was
forced to leave his home and he joined Tycho de Brahe in
Prague and after the letter's death he studied his observational 
data and continued the task of working out a system which
fitted that data. In particular, he worked on the orbit 
of Mars and after much mathematical calculation he came to
the correct conclusion that the orbit was elliptical . not 
circular. Here was another part of the revolution, and there 
is the added fact that the Copernican model is put on a sounder 
basis.
From this he went on to ask the question of why this was
the case and to see that there were laws which were applicable
to the solar system and he drew up the Three Laws of Planetary
(a) It could be said that this questionis implicit 
in the Ptolemaic model as well !
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motion which are the basis of subsequent theories. In summary 
these state, one, that a planet moves round the sun in an 
ellipse, two that the radius vector of the planet sweeps 
out equal areas in equal times and, three, that for any planet, 
the square of the sidereal period is proportional to the
cube of the planet’s mean distance from the sun. The Copernican 
model has now been put on a sound mathematical basis.
The establishment of these laws was only possible as the
result of the work of Tycho de Brahe (1546-1601) who was 
a diligent observer who made accurate, precise and continuous 
measurements of the stars and planets. However, it is known 
that he never accepted the Copernican model, partly because 
of his religious views and partly because it would mean that 
the stars were unimaginably remote. He accepted the Aristotelan 
view of the unchanging heavens and his model was one in which 
the planets revolved around the sun and the sun, moon and
planets orbited the earth. Yet it was his observations that
enabled Kepler to put the Copernican theory on a scientific 
basis.
Galileo (1564-1642) was a great experimenter and he is regarded 
as the founder of experimental mechanics. He became professor 
of mathematics at Pisa and this required that he also taught 
astronomy. He became convinced that the Copernican theory 
was correct although he was still required to teach the Ptolemaic 
system. In 1609 be heard of the invention of the telescope 
and constructed one for his own use. Between 1610 and 1619
he used his telescope and by its means made a number of important 
discoveries which provided the confirmation of the Copernican
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system. His observations of Venus showed that the full range
of phases, from crescent to full disc could be seen; this
is only possible if Venus orbits the sun and if the sun is
at the centre. He also observed that Jupiter had four satellites 
orbiting it, in contradiction to the traditional view that 
the earth was at the centre of everything. Galileo had firstly 
observed the moon and discovered that the surface is rough 
and mountainous like the surface of the earth. He made drawings 
of what he saw and attempted to measure the height of the
mountains. In 1632 his book "Dialogue Concerning the Two 
Chief World Systems" was published I, which sets out his arguments 
for the heliocentric system. The consequence of this was 
the conflict between him and the church; a complex story 
which ended with his trial and recantation in 1632. (He 
lived on under virtual house arrest until his death in 1642.) 
Galileo and Kepler had briefly correspondedbut they never 
met and it would seem each worked independently of the other. 
&  has been noted that Kepler had used the extensive observational 
data of Brahe for his own theoretical work. All three contributed 
to the establishment of the Copernican model on a sound scientific 
basis and this model of the solar system has remained unchanged 
since that time.
This brief historical survey gives a general overview of 
how the model changed; the question is whether it merits 
the description revolutionary according to Kuhn's thesis.
I think that it provides a good example; there had been a 
long period of increasing modifications to the Ptolemaic
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model to deal with discrepancies, leading to a crisis and 
after a time to a resolution and the establishment of a new 
model. In this time not only did the model change but there 
were such significant changes in the world view that the 
new can be said to be incommensurable with the old. MacIntyre 
has summed up this "What the scientific genius, such as Galileo, 
achieves in his transition, then, is not only a new way of 
understanding nature, but also and inseparably a new way
of understanding the old science's way of understanding nature." (4) 
The revolution in the understanding of the scientific model 
can be summed up thus:-
à) The centre of the solar system is the sun not the earth.
b) The earth revolves on its own axis.
c) The orbits of the planets are elliptical and not circular.
d) The moon orbits the earth and Jupiter also has its own
orbiting satellites.
e) New 'stars' are observed (the supernova) and the telescope
indicated that there were many more stars than had been thought.
In particular the work of Galileo led to a changed understanding
of science. This has been usefully summarised by Barbour.
"The Middle Ages sought explanations in terms of the true
form or intelligible essence of an object and the purpose
it fulfilled. Attention was directed to the final end and not to
the detailed process of change . medieval science was
primarily deductive .... rather than inductive ___ Galileo
deliberately set aside all questions of purpose and "final
cause" and introduced a totally different kind of concept
for the interpretation of nature." (5) There was a changed
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picture of the universe. Christian Theology and the Aristotelean 
and Ptolemaic cosmology of the Middle Ages had combined to 
give a model of the universe which was static, everything 
h&d its proper position and destiny, status was graded in 
a heirarchy c f reality and the natural world was complete 
and unchanging. Now this was changed, a new and different 
picture was proposed, one that would eventually lead to the 
modern day understanding. Kepler had shown that the laws 
of physics were universally applicable and Galileo had made 
the connection between experiment and theory explicit. Lastly, 
there was a changed understanding of theology. It is noted 
that the changes were due not only to the Copernican revolution 
but also to the turmoil of the Reformation. The Scholastic 
thought focussed in the teaching of Aquinas, provided an 
integrated intellectual system. "Reason is an important
preamble to faith .... But this natural theology remained
secondary to revealed theology  Revelation is necessary
because the most important truths are not accessible to reason■
  faith is .... the acceptance of revealed truth on
the authority of the church .... the Bible was only one
element in this total system." (6) Humankind was at the 
centre of the created order and nature was the setting of 
the divine plan. This was all to be changed, the vastness 
of the universe, that the earth was no longer the centre 
and the first forays against Biblical literalism all meant 
that a new understanding of the place of humans in the divine 
plan was required. However, it should be said that in spite
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of all these changes there were few signs of the conflict
of science and religion that was to dominate later thinking. 
Kepler and Galileo remained faithful Christians throughout 
their lives and saw their work to be a means of increasing 
the knowledge of God's world. (Also see section 3).
2. MODELS OF THE ORIGINS OF THE EARTH
Introduction. Another area which is particularly relevant 
to this study are the genesis/geology debates which occured 
in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. It
is a complex area with many strands but it provides further 
illustrations of the inter-relationships of models in science 
and theology and of Kuhn's thesis about revolutions.
In the period under consideration (1780-1830) the attention
was upon the earth itself; the heliocentric model of the 
solar system had been accepted for over one hundred and fifty 
years and although there had been considerable improvements 
in the quality of telescopes and observational techniques,
it remained unchanged. At this time there developed, mainly 
in Britain, a very vigorous debate about the origins of the 
earth among those who studied the new science of geology. 
Geology had grown out of the study of mineralogy and the 
study of natural history. There were strong religious overtones 
in this search for understanding and interpretation of the 
observations, for they were expected to be in accord with 
the understanding of the book of Genesis. The majority of 
those who were involved assumed the literal veracity of the 
accounts in Genesis both of the creation and the flood, and 
that Moses was the author of the book. The flood in particular
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being crucial to the arguments . C. C. Gillispie in his 
book, "Genesis and Geology" gives a detailed study of this 
discussion and this work provides the basis for this section. 
The result of this debate was to establish a new model for 
the origins of the earth which would be incommensurable with
the old one. This new model would subsequently be one of
the factors in the development of Darwin's theories and later 
to the separation of scientific and theological models.
In order to show how the revolution came about the main historical 
factors will be briefly reviewed.
Beginnings. It is a complex story and in order to outline 
the key issues and individuals I have summarised them in 
chart form (appendix 4). However, this is a simplification 
and it cannot therefore indicate all the subtleties of the
discussion. The latter part of the eighteenth century was 
a time of great increase in scientific research, both qualitatively 
and quantitively. It was the time of the foundation of new 
scientific societies in Britain, including the Linnean Society, 
the Lunar Society in Birmingham and the Royal Society of
Edinburgh. (The Royal Society of London had been founded 
in 1660.) These were broad based and showed little specialisation 
and all subjects of interest were discussed; natural philosop^^ 
religion and politics and the results of their deliberations 
were published in their journals. It is in these that much 
of the geological material was published.
William Paley (1743-1805) in his writings, particularly in 
"Natural Theology, or Evidences of the Existence and Attributes 
of the Deity, collected from the Appearances of Nature" summed 
up the general understanding of his time. In fact, it could 
be said that the title of his book sums it up! He was utilitarian
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in outlook and expediency was the key to his thinking; he 
saw the evidence for the existence of God as designer in 
the purposeful and benevolent aspects of nature. "There 
cannot be design without a designer; contrivance without 
a contriver; arrangement without anything capable of arranging
....... Arrangement, disposition of parts, subserviency
of means to an end, relation of instruments to a use, imply 
the presence of intelligence and mind." (7)
Paley's models of God and of science were typical of his 
time and have their origins in the mechanistic models of 
Newton. |.t was still a static model of the world and the 
task of the scientist was seen to be that of elucidating 
and describing the natural world. Around 1790 when the debate 
was about to begin the consensus of views has been summarised 
by Gillespie thus:-
"1. It was recognised that fossils were the residual remains 
of living creatures.
2. Noah's flood probably accounted for the presence of fossils 
on mountain tops.
3. The flood was universal and was the agent of vast changes 
and accounts for the present appearance of the earth.
4. The earth was not of great antiquity, it had a beginning 
and was thought to be about six thousand years old.
5. There were two views of the creation of animal and vegetable 
life; one stated that there had been one act of creation, 
the other that there had been a number of special creations. 
Both views assumed the permanence and immutability of species 
and that humankind was of recent origin.
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6. God was governor as well as creator and Genesis was taken 
in a completely literal way." (8)
The general concerns were to ensure that the geological models 
did not contradict Genesis and that atheistic interpretations
were not allowed to infiltrate from elsewhere. The models
of origins were required to fit the theological models derived 
from the understanding of that time of the book of Genesis.
In the background there was a desire for stability which 
had its own history in the politics of the time. This is 
the background from which the arguments proceeded and which 
would undergo a change so extensive that it can certainly
be termed a revolution according to Kuhn's criteria.
The debate. As the debate began there were two main schools
of thought, the Neptunist and the Vulcanist. The founder of
Neptunist geology (or geognosy as it was termed), was A.
G. Werner of Saxony and his system was expounded by Robert 
Jameson- of Edinburgh and Richard Kirwan of Ireland. Their 
argument was that all rock formations had been precipitated
either chemically or mechanically from aqueous solution and
this had taken place in clearly defined stages which accounted 
for the strata to be observed in the rocks. The problem
was that this system could not explain the existence of non­
horizontal strata or where all the water had gon^ e» but its
advantage was its simplicity and that itmade no demands 
for a lengthy time scale.
The opposite view, the Vulcanist, was put forward by James 
Hutton in his "Theory of the Earth" (1795), which was the 
first comprehensive treatise on geology. This book was concerned
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with the dynamics of the earth rather than its origins; John
Playfair of Edinburgh developed the ideas further. The approach 
was vigorously empirical, requiring that only that which
is observed now is relevant. It was observed that basically 
two kinds of rock were present, the igneous and those of 
aquatic origin, and that only intense heat could cause the 
observed effects. Volcanic eruptions were the source and 
sign of this great and powerful heat. The theory explained 
much that the other did not but it required the assumption 
that a vast length of time was needed for the changes
since they were very slow and this view was not yet acceptable.
Hutton's views were attacked by Kirwan basically because 
Hutton did not seem to accept the literal understanding of 
Genesis and was not concerned about origins. Kirwan argued 
that Moses must be taken as the guide to the events of the 
earth's history and geological theories must be set alongside 
the Mosaic account. Jean Andre Deluc, although supporting 
the Neptunist view, suggested that there were two distinct 
eras, the first formative period which gave rise to the continents 
which could have taken a very long time, the second was the 
recent period which began with a great flood and resulted 
in the earth as we now know it. Playfair responded by defending 
Hutton against the charge of atheism and emphasised the religious 
dimension of their views and how these testified to the work 
of God the Designer.
So the argument continued, with others becoming involved; 
there was as a result a number of different models of the 
origins of the earth but which all had in common the desire
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of their proposers to relate the geological to the Biblical. 
Certainly no one seemd to question the historicity of the 
account of the flood in Genesis. Yet it can be seen that 
there was (perhaps unconsciously) a movement from the static 
models to more dynamic ones.
Résolution. Between 1791 and 1799, William Smith, through 
his work as a drainage engineer had observed the fossil content 
of rocks and he realised that the "proper way to investigate, 
classify, and describe stratigraphical structure was by means 
of the characteristic fossil content of successive formations." (9) 
The significance of his work was not recognised until the 
1820's and then only through the writings of Joseph Townsend, 
who rejected most of both the Neptunist and Vulcanist arguments 
and yet still claimed that the geological evidence was consistent 
with the Biblical accounts.
Between 1820 and 1830 a different theory was proposed by 
William Buckland that of catastrophism and he was supported 
by Georges Cuvier, a comparative anatomist who had observed
that there were fossil remains of animals which no longer
lived on earth. They suggested that the changes had been
caused by cataclysmic events which had occured throughout 
the history of the earth, culminating in Noah's flood which 
was assumed to be a universal deluge. Buckland continued in 
the tradition of seeing in the study _ of geology the study
of God's creation and he argued that the facts were consistent with 
Genesis. In 1821 he made a thorough investigation of a large 
cavern in Yorkshire where a vast number of bones of prehistoric 
animals were found and* which he saw as firm evidence of the
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flood. (Evidence for his diluvial theory). Increasingly 
at this time, there were questions about the evidence and
its interpretation, in particular there were reservations
about the extent of the flood, catastrophic chronology and 
the age of the earth.
The resolution came in the work of Charles Lyell in his three 
volume work "Principles of Geology" (1830-3), and a new model 
was proposed, a model . which did not require that geology 
conform to a literal understanding of Genesis. Gillispie 
says "Lyell's ideas seem to have formed rather suddenly."
(10) In the c o n t e : of my reading of Kuhn this is a key
factor in a revolution, "these   (crises)   are terminated,
not by deliberation and interpretation but by a relatively 
sudden and unstructured event like the gestalt switch."
( 11) :
His Uniform! tarian theory was to provide the basis of the 
new model. "He did not, of course, deny the reality of change, 
but he insisted that all change had been uniform, proceeding 
in cycles in time rather like the orbits in space through
which the planets swing." (12) An example of how models
in one area can be suggested by those in another and a part
of their creative aspect.
The changes to be observed had come about through a variety 
of causes, the action of the atmosphere, of living organisms, 
of earthquakes, of volcanoes and above all the action of 
water. The consequence was that the Biblical flood was no
longer seen to be the primary and universal geological agency 
or even necessary for the chronological classification. 
More importantly was the acceptance of the great age of the
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earth, although this was still far less than the figure accepted 
today. But the revolution ha.d occured, the new model replaced 
the old; there would still be debate before this would be 
accepted, the usual consequence of a revolution. There could 
be no return to the past and the way was prepared for Darwin's 
theories which would be part of the separation of science 
and theology.
3. MODERN COSMOLOGICAL THEORIES
Introduction It is in the last hundred years that there 
has been a considerable development in the scientific models 
of the origins of the earth and of the universe and this 
development has been separate from any of the theological 
thinking. Thus compared to the two topics already discussed, 
it is a very different scene and illustrative of how the 
scientific models today are independent of the theological. 
It, therefore, becomes a task for theologians to offer reflections 
and reactions to the scientific models.
The Copernican model of the solar system is limited by the 
assumption that it is a uniform, unchanging, static system 
and it does not offer any answer to the question of how it 
is as it is. At present the key question is about the beginning 
and a number of models have been proposed, the one that is 
now most widely accepted is the 'Big-Bang' model. (However 
it is salutary to be reminded as by M. Hesse that in this 
area as in most of what has already been discussed that the 
evidence on which the theories are based is underdetermined.) 
However, this view does not take account of the imaginative 
power of a model which can lead to a new and better understanding 
and interpretation of the albeit limited information.
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The traditional view that the solar system is uniform is 
still held and has been extended to the Universe; the acceptance 
of this is the result of a number of different observations 
which will be noted later. J. Gribbin sums this up "the 
idea that the Universe at largelooks the same wherever you 
are in it - in other words, not just isotropic but homogeneous. 
The idea that the Universe ought to look the same, in broad 
outline, in all directions and to all observers in it is 
so important that it is called the cosmological principle 
— and without this uniformity, there could be no successful 
science of cosmology." (13) The model of the Universe
now is that it is uniform, changing and expanding. The basis 
for how this can be, will now be explored.
Einstein model In 1916 and 1917 Einstein published his
papers on general relativity which provided the basis for 
modern mathematical cosmology. The papers only indirectly 
mention astronomy, but the results of his theory were to 
revolutionise thinking on the subject. This revolution in 
the models proposed was far-reaching since it altered the 
framework of rules from which predictions about the world 
can be made. W. McCrea sums up the change "Classical physics 
uses a universal three-dimensional space and a universal 
one dimension time. Special relativity physics uses one
four—dimensional "flat" space—time. General relativity uses 
four—dimensional space—time. General relativity is expressed 
in mathematical equations and the result is that there is 
a single entity which models space—time and matter. There 
are no boundary conditions, and a system so defined is termed 
a universe." (14) Einstein in a final short paragraph
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to his paper, mentions the actual Universe of astronomy and 
expresses the possibility that his model might roughly approximate 
to it. His model is a self-consistent theoretical model 
which provided a new theory of gravitation. The model is 
derived from Einstein's thought, not from observation and 
is an excellent example of a theoretical or mathematical 
model. (See chapter two.) From this theoretical model three 
predictions were made, firstly the advance of the perihelion 
iri planetary motion, secondly the bending of light rays in 
a gravitational field, and thirdly the gravitational red—shift 
of lines in spectra of radiating massive bodies. The first 
was verified by the known and hitherto unexplained discrepency 
in the orbit of Mercury. During an eclipse of the sun in 
1919» observations were made which verified the second and 
the third is a consequence of the equivalence of mass and 
energy, (Einstein's equation E=mc^ ) and which experiments 
in physics have confirmed. Yet, as J. Gribben says "Einstein's 
equations describe the geometry of space-time, and naturally 
he wanted to apply them to the geometry of all space—time 
- the Universe itself. He. tried to do this in accordance 
with the then current paradigm that the Universe is isotropic
  homogenous .... and static. But he failed. The simplest
interpretation of the equations only allowed non—static] 
models." (13)
models. In 1922 Friedmann produced solutions to 
Elristein's equations which showed that the Universe had to 
be either expanding or contracting. Observation indicates 
that it is expanding and this proposed model is now generally 
accepted. If the Universe is expanding then it must have
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been more compact and taken to the limit there must be a 
point beyond which it is not possible to go, that point being 
the Big-Bang. Penrose and Hawkins have concluded from the 
general relativity theory that the Universe must possess 
one 'singularity' at least. "In the context, singularity 
is a sophisticated concept to define, but it means an event 
in space-time where the physical behaviour, that holds good 
at non-singular events, breaks down. This implies that there 
cannot exist a relativistic cosmological model that does 
not exhibit a big bang or some such set of features." (15) 
Big-Bang models. From these models, a new theoretical model 
was proposed and formalised in 1948 by Gamow, Alpher and 
Hermann as the Big-Bang model. The significant fact in 
these models is that they provide instances of the interplay 
between theoretical and observational models and also examples 
of the power of prediction that exists in a good model. 
Prediction that is subssequently confirmed through observation, 
experiment and calculation. From the Gamow model came: three 
predictions, firstly that the universe is expanding, secondly 
that there should be a background radiation and thirdly that 
there is a definite hydrogen/helium proportion in the Universe. 
In the 1920's Edwin Hubble made many observations and from 
these deduced that there were many galaxies which are evenly 
distributed across the sky. Through his measurements of 
the 'red shift' of these he was able to make- estimates of 
distance and suggested that they are proportional. This 
became known as Hubble's law and is evidence for an expanding 
universe and since all galaxies are apparently moving away
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from every other one, this is seen as further evidence for 
a uniform Universe. The proposed big—bang would have generated 
a vast quantity of heat which would have gradually dissipated 
and the residual heat should therefore be observable. In 
the 1960's Penzias and Wilson were working on radio communica­
tions and were puzzled by a universal background 'noise'. 
Investigation showed that the origins of this was in deep 
space and that it showed a spectrum of thermal radiation 
at 3K. This microwave radiation was further evidence of 
the big bang and provided the means of estimating the age 
of the Universe. (10-20 thousand million years.)
Observations had shown that helium accounted for about twenty 
five per cent of the mass of visible matter in the Universe 
and that hydrogen accounted for most of the rest. This again 
is found to be uniformally distributed. Theoretical calculation 
from the known constants of physics, estimates of the expansion 
rate of the Universe at the time when the reactions to produce 
helium would have occured produced a similar result which 
thus confirms the theory.
Conclusion. Other models have been proposed as for example, 
thesteady—state theory and there continues discussion about 
the Big-Bang theory and there are many unanswered problems. 
There does not as yet seem to be a revolution in Kuhn's terms 
rather a developing and growing understanding. It could 
possibly be argued that the present state of cosmology is 
in the 'pre-revolutionary' stage with a number of conflicting 
views. V. Clube has summarised Kuhn's argument for revolutions
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in respect of the cosmological theories and says "Let us
have no illusions about the position - many experienced astonomers 
are quite certain that revolution is round the corner. From
this fact springs much of the excitement in modern astronomy." (16) 
Only time will tell!
Anthropic principle An interesting aspect of the discussion
of the models is that philosophical questions are being raised 
including those about the ultimate fate of the Universe,
the fact that all the features are essentially determined
by a few basic physical laws and constants and this universe
is comprehensible. Brandon Carter has enunciated what he 
calls the 'anthropic principle'which says "that a world containing 
men is not any old universe, 'specified at random' so to
speak, but it has to have a very particular character in
its basic laws and circumstances." (17) This could possibly
lead to a new, argument from design and thus bring back a 
theological dimension into the discussion.
4. FURTHER BIBLICAL AND THEOLOGICAL ASPECTS
Introduction The Biblical models of creator/creation have 
been considered in chapter four and the way the first chapters 
of Genesis were used in the geological debates has also been
discussed. Throughout most of Christian history, the Bible 
has been central to the understanding of doctrine although
the exegesis and methods of interpretation have changed. 
For example in the early centuries allegorical interpretation
predominated, to be replaced for a time by a literalism which 
still has reverberations today in some fundamentalist groups.
The difficulty : is how far it is possible to think oneself back
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into a different cultural and religious understanding and 
so discern how people saw the question of God as Creator
and the nature of creation. It is a complex and long history 
and all it is possible to do is again make some 'markers
on the map'.
In the earlier sections I have outlined how the Greeks had
studied astronomy and the influence of the Ptolemaic model 
which persisted until the Middle Ages. There is little evidence 
that the Jewish people studied astronomy apart from the practical 
. requirements of establishing an accurate calender so that 
the dates of festivals could be determined and in particular 
the start of the Passover. R. Hookyas emphasises the difference 
between the models of the Greek philosophers and those of
the Bible and the consequences of this. "There is a radical 
contrast between the deification:; of nature in pagan religion 
and in a rationalised form, in Greek philosophy, and the
^®"daification of nature in the Bible   In the first
chapters of Genesis it is made evident that absolutely nothing, 
except God, has any claim to divinity." (18)
That there were differences is clear but the background assumption 
was that there was no separation between sacred and secular 
and it was not until the 19th century that the division came 
about. Both types of models were linked through the influence
of Greek philosophy on theology.
The Reformation and after The revolution in models of cosmology 
that took place at this period was to have an impact on the 
concepts of the world. As a result of the work of Kepler
and Galileo it was no longer possible to hold that circular 
motion was the ideal and what the Creator must have intended, 
nor after the observation by Brahe of a new star that the
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heavens remain as they were created at the beginning. There 
are the beginnings of the recognition that this is a changing 
not static world, and that the models will also change.
Yet in all this the aim of the scientists was the desire
to express their conviction that they were studying God's
world. The title of a book by John Ray published in 1691 
"The Wisdom of God manifested in the Works of Creation" in
fact sums up the attitude exactly. There is much debate 
about the effects of the Reformation on scientific research 
and the reasons for the great explosion of work among those 
of Protestant and Puritan persuasion. Robert K. Merton in
1936 in an important paper said "It is the thesis of this 
study that the Puritan ethic, as an ideal-typical expression 
of the value-attitudes basic to ascetic Protestantism generally, 
so canalised the interests of seventeenth century Englishmen 
as to constitute one important element in the enhanced cultiva­
tion of science. The deep rooted religious interests of
the day demanded in their forceful implications the systematic, 
rational, and empirical study of Nature for the glorification 
of God in His works and for the control of the corrupt 
world." (19) There is yet no indication of a division
between science and theology, but the question of a literalist 
view of the Bible was being raised. Some writers, for example, 
suggested that the _ authors of the Bible had written at the 
level of the uneducated. John Colet in 1500 said "Moses
proceeds in due order to deal with particular objects and 
set before us the arrangement of the universe in detail.
And this he does in such a way, in my opinion, that we may
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perceive him ^ have regard to popular conceptions and to the 
uneducated multitude whom he taught." (20)
Newton (1647-1727) is rightly remembered for his significant 
contributions in science but he also wrote on theology. 
The result of his and others thinking resulted in the mechanistic 
model of creation; God was seen as a Divine Clockmaker who 
set the world going and then had left it to its own devices.
Newton also suggested a model of God as Cosmic Manipulator
who stepped in when necessary to make corrections to the 
progress of the movements of the planets in the solar system.
The scientists saw themselves involved in a religious task 
but from the formularies of the churches there is little 
evidence of any impact of science on the official teaching.
The Book of Common Prayer (1662) and the Thirty Nine Articles 
merely refer to God as Creator in the creeds. ; The Westminster 
Confession adds slightly to this "It pleased God the Father, 
Son and Holy Ghost, for the manifestation of the glory of 
his eternal power, wisdom and goodness, in the beginning,
to create, or make of nothing, the world, and all things 
therein, whether invisible or invisible, in the space of 
six days, and all very good." (21)
It was in the eighteenth century that there was the development 
of study of ' Natural Theology as for example in the work of 
William Paley (1734-1805). He sought to prove the existence 
of God from the evidence of nature. His arguments owe much 
to earlier ideas but his approach was clear and summed up 
the theological thinking of his time. His book was to become 
a classic and influenced thinking throughout the nineteenth 
century. The model of God as Creator that can be derived
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from his work was that which was generally accepted in Britain. 
The model was deterministic and mechanistic, the key idea 
was still of the Divine Clockmaker which was explored with 
its implications and predictions, in a consistent manner. 
The literalism in the genesis/geology debate was partly as 
a consequence of this view. The very many developments in
science and in biblical theology in the nineteenth century 
are only indirectly of concern in this thesis and it is not 
possible to review them here. That there was much controversy 
is clear and this controversy can be seen focussed in the 
debates on Darwinism. The result of these complex and at
times very heated debates was to see the division of science 
from theology. The consequences were that two key changes 
can be observed in the scientific models, firstly to see 
that nature is dynamic, it is in a state of change and that 
there are many interacting forces to be seen, and secondly 
that the rule of scientific laws could be extended from the 
physical to the biological world. The argument from design 
was challenged and it became realised that humankind was 
part of the animal kingdom and not necessarily a special 
creation. This scientific model would eventually lead to 
a reconsideration of the theological models.
Present day In chapter four I sought to show how extensive 
is the use of model language in theology today, and that
it is in all areas not just in the subject of this thesis. 
The relationship between models in science and theology is 
a changing feature as has been indicated, from the close 
inter-relationship of earlier centuries to the divisions
of last century to the new influences today. It is recognised
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that there are two aspects of this, firstly the use of scientific
models in the arguments for a belief in God — the emergence
of 3. new form of the argument from design and secondly the
implications for the models of God as for example in renewed
emphasis on the place of the imagination. From what has 
sl^sady been discussed it is clear that as there has been 
a revolution in scientific models from, for example, the 
static to a dynamic understanding of creation, so there has
been a similar revolution in theological models in recent 
years. One notable attempt to express a dynamic model of 
continuing creation occurs in process theology; this is a 
subject which is too large to approach here. (It is noted 
I realise that it could be an area for future investigation 
for me.) The consequences of present theological study is 
to provide some new models ; the models of God are of a creator 
who is active in the creation, who is in relationship with, it,
who is a suffering God, who cannot be defined in only masculine 
terms but must include the feminine and yet is beyond time 
and space. In a similar way there are those who argue that 
creation must be seen as dynamic and continuing and which
is an 'open' system, views which are very different from
earlier centuries.
Conclusion
Four topics have been considered to illustrate my theme showing the 
application of model language and considering the nature 
of the changes in the understanding of creator and creation 
that have taken place. In the study of the Copernican revolution 
it was observed how the theological and philosophical perspectives
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of the period often dictated the nature of the scientific 
approach. This is still to be observed in the genesis/geology 
debate, where those involved tried to be true to the then 
generally- accepted literalistic interpretation of the Bible. 
However, when the recent scientific theories of cosmology 
and the proposed models are considered, it is clear that 
these are considered quite separately from any theological 
viewpoints. Generally it seems that in this century it is 
the scientists who have "set the agenda" and the theologians 
who have followed along; or at least that is how it can appear 
to those outside and it is relevant to ask how far theology 
is or should be dependent on scientific models for its expression. 
In this thesis I have tried to show the nature of possible 
inter-relationships, and I think that is a valid area for 
exploration with both disciplines making useful contributions 
to the fuller understanding of the issues involved. I stressed 
earlier the creative and imaginative features in models both 
in science and theology, and it is here that I feel there 
can be positive and valuable communication between scientists 
and theologians.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
CONCLUSIONS
I have considered the understanding and use of models in science 
showing how philosphers have explored the different theories 
of models and then how they are used in practice. The functions 
and applications were explored to show the extent of that use. 
It is recognised that there are limitations in their use, and 
that for some people these limitations are such that they would
want to discard models altogether. However .it has been my
f": -
aim to show that in science they are a necessary component 
in the development and communication of theories and concepts.
I then continued the discussion to show how the language of 
models is extended to theology and to indicate the relationship 
with analogy, metaphor and symbol. The next chapter looked 
at the understanding and use ' of models in theology along the 
same lines as those in science. Here it was shown that there
are ways in which they are similar, particularly in the ways 
that they function and in their ability to be effective in 
creative and imaginative thought. Consideration was given 
to the effect that models have on the thinking and action of
individuals and communities and it was recognised that in both 
spheresthey evoke response albeit of very different kinds. 
Yet there are differences, (which were discussed in chapter four) 
and these are mainly that the models in theology interpret 
experience, whereas those in science interpret observation.
I also argued that models in theology are more comprehensive
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and inclusive and support many more metaphors then in science.
I hope that in this discussion and the comparisons of the under­
standing and use I have shown that they have an importance 
and value particularly in communication and interpretation. 
Particularly in theology it would seem necessary for communication 
to be in contemporary language and that will mean that this 
will include the use of models. I would want to stress their 
usefulness while still recognising the limitations and the 
need for understanding of the theoretical ànd philosophical 
background.
Another consequence of this study has been the recognition 
of the significance of models in the exposition and interpretation 
of the doctrine of creation. Since the time of Darwin,Christians 
have often been on the defensive when faced with the evidences 
of science, for say, evolution or the origins of the cosmos. 
For some the response has been to retreat into literalistic 
interpretation of Genesis and a rejection of the scientific 
consensus about origins ; others have interpreted the Biblical 
accounts of origins only in the context of the scientific theories. 
The language of models, properly understood offers one way 
for a positive theological approach to these responses and 
the means of making connections with the scientific understanding.
A number of authors, including some of those I have cited, 
have in a variety of ways sought to do this. The language 
of models has become one of the tools that is used. The obverse 
of this is the acknowledgement of the place of the creative 
imagination in science and that the concepts of, for example 
cosmology or atomic physics are productive of ideas which are 
more than the mere scientific statements.
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I recognise that care has to be taken not to confuse logical 
types. Thus the question has been raised as to whether the 
complementary models as in physics (e.g. wave/particle duality) 
can be extended to theology. It is an interesting matter but 
there are difficulties chiefly in that the relationships involved 
are in very different categories. I would see this as an area
foï' further exploration but this is beyond the scope of this 
work, however, I do think that there can be useful 'cross- 
fertilisation' of ideas.
I the subject of the way in which models change or are
changed of particular interest. This has been .discussed in 
the context of T. S. Kuhn's thesis and it has been applied
in the examples given. I think that his whole argument on 
the nature and extent of revolutions has wide implications 
and is relevant to theology and personal experience. Conversion 
experiences for an individual or within the cultural experience 
of 3. Christian community can have something of the character 
of a revolution. The models of theology as they affect the 
present way of life may well be incommensurable with what went 
before. This though emphasises the problem of incommensurability 
and it is useful to be reminded of R. Bernstein's distinctions, 
so that there can be incompatibility and incommensurability 
between old and new, but still there is comparability. (Chapter 5, 
reference 8).
Through the various aspects of this thesis I have sought to 
expand and develop the understanding and use of models in science 
and theology. I have focussed on the various concepts of creation
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and I have shown by the chosen examples how this can be applied 
and developed. Throughout, there has been an underlying desire 
to explore possible inter-relationships between science and 
theology and it is hoped that a contribution to this has been 
made in the course of this work.
At the beginning, I used the analogy of map—making and to conclude 
I want to express the hope that I have succeeded in marking 
out a useful route and that this thesis can make a further 
contribution to the map.
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Appendix 2
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Model ot the universe; the outermost sphere is Saturn’s. 
Illustration in Kepler’s Mysteriutn cosmographtcum.
(A. Keostler, The Sleepwalkers, p252)
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Appendix 3
The Ptolemaic Theory
According to this, a 
planet moved in a small 
circle(epicycle), while 
the centre of this 
itself moved round the 
earth in a perfect 
circle.
(P. Moore, History of 
Astronomy, p.25)
Retrograde Movement of 
Mars
The apparent path of Mars 
in the sky is given at the 
top of the diagram, and 
the actual relative posi­
tions of the Earth and 
Mars at the bottom. It 
will be seen that between 
positions 3 and 6 the Earth 
catches up on Mars and for 
this period Mars seems to 
move in a retrograde or 
backward movement among the 
stars. Behaviour of this 
sort was very difficult to 
explain on the old theory 
and was one of the reasons 
why Ptolemy was forced to 
add further epicycles.
(P. Moore, History of 
Astronomy, p.33)
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POSTSCRIPT
REVIEW OF MODELS AND MYSTEP.V - I, T. RAMSEY 
In Models and Mystery, I. T. Ramsey develops his understanding and 
use of models in theology which was originally set out in Religious 
Language (reviewed in Chapter Three). This work answers some of 
the criticisms made of the earlier book, and he makes some useful 
connections between the use of models in a variety of disciplines.
V He says "It is by the use of models that each discipline provides 
its understanding of a mystery which confronts them all". (1) 
In particular he affirms his belief in the mystery that is at the, 
heart of theology; this mystery is assumed in this context and not 
justified or explored as such.
In the first chapter, he begins by asking what a model is, and answers 
the question by discussing the historical scientific use. Then 
a model was thought of as a replica, a scale model or a mechanical 
model. Ramsey refers to these as 'picturing models' and indicates 
that they still have a useful place in science. He suggests that 
some theological discourse also uses picturing models, and in both 
disciplines it makes possible the articulation of concepts and to 
offer reliable genuine descriptions. However, the assumption of 
identity can obviously lead to problems and it becomes necessary 
to find an alternative. He quotes Max Black's use of the term 'analogue 
models' in science and suggests the term 'disclosure models' for 
those in theology which are not pictorial models. (The problems 
of identity of model with that modelled is discussed further in 
chapters two and four of this thesis). He continues by looking at some 
uses of analogue models in science and then considers parallel uses 
in theology and suggests they enable us to articulate that
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"(1) models can be seen as builders of discourse ....
(enabling) .... interpretations of phenomena ....
(2) models .... enable us to make sense of discourse whose logical
structure is so perplexing as to inhibit literacy ....
il
(3) ....models enable us to talk of what eludes us (2)
Then it becomes possible to be reliably articulate in theology, as 
in science, providing that the models relate insight with experience. 
However, it is recognised that models in theology cannot be judged 
for their success or failure by reference to the possibility of 
verifiable deductions, as in science, but rather by their success 
in harmonising events over a wide range - their 'empirical fit'.
Ramsey concludes the chapter thus "Models, whether in theology or 
science, are not descriptive miniatures, they are not picture 
enlargements; in each case they point to mystery, to the need for
us to live as best we can with theological and scientific 
uncertainties." (3)
In the second chapter, Ramsey discusses the use of disclosure models 
in psychology and the social sciences, in order that they will enable 
these to be articulate and to have a degree of scientific precision, 
while still recognising they deal with individual persons. These, 
particular discussions, whilst of general interest, are not relevant
to the subject of this thesis. 1 was interested to note that he
-uses— the analogy of map-making, which analogy— I— ha^ 'o— referred to
elsewhere.
The third and final chapter discusses the relation between metaphors 
and models and Ramsey notes the similarities, suggesting that metaphors 
like disclosure models "enable us to be articulate and are born 
in insight". (4)
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Good metaphors like good models offer many possibilities for a whole 
cluster of inferences. (In my discussion of analogy, I suggested 
that a good model was one which had a large fund of neutral analogy 
- see page 34/5) . He does not explore in any detail the relationship
between metaphor and model, but stresses again the place of 'insight'
across all the academic disciplines mentioned. He also touches 
on the importance for him of the imagination - an aspect of models
which I have discussed. Both insight and imagination are of particular
importance in theology; "for theology .... is founded in occasions
of insight and disclosure .... when theology neglects the mystery
in its heart .... its life breath disappears." (5) Metaphors
and models are the basic currency for mystery, and the task is to 
elucidate more faithfully this mystery.
He continues by making the point that theology demands and thrives 
on a diversity of models, and he returns to the need for "qualifiers" 
for models (see discussion in chapter three p.37-9), since at the 
heart of theology there is permanent mystery. He illustrates this 
by an example of a practical and theological question - what is 
meant by the unity of the church? - and shows how the understanding 
and use of models can be of value in elucidating an answer to this 
question and to other topics of concern to thinking people.
This book provides a useful expansion of the ideas initially expressed 
by Ramsey in Religious Language. There is overlap with other writers, 
who have been considered and whose understanding of use of models 
has been discussed in the thesis. This book adds another example 
to those I have already given of how the use of model language 
has rapidly been included in much theological discussion.
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